Authorization bypass via path binding override in elixir-grpc/grpc HTTP transcoding
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
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| elixir-grpc | grpc | unaffected |
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| elixir-grpc | grpc | unaffected |
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| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
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| Elixir-grpc | Grpc |
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| Elixir-grpc | Grpc |
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| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
Github GHSA |
GHSA-mwr4-5g34-j5cq | gRPC Erlang package's path bindings are overridable by query string and request body |
No CVSS v3.1
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.339% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| Description | Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in elixir-grpc grpc allows authenticated attackers to access or modify resources belonging to other users by smuggling a conflicting value for any path-bound field via the query string or request body. In 'Elixir.GRPC.Server.Transcode':map_request/5 (lib/grpc/server/transcode.ex), all three clauses use Map.merge/2 with path bindings as the first argument, giving them the lowest merge precedence. A request such as GET /users/me/profile?user_id=victim (or a POST with {"user_id": "victim"} when body: "*") yields a decoded protobuf struct where the path-bound field carries the attacker-supplied value rather than the router-extracted value. Any handler that uses the path-bound field for authorization, multi-tenancy scoping, or ownership checks is silently bypassed. This issue affects grpc from 0.8.0 before 1.0.0. | Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in elixir-grpc grpc allows authenticated attackers to access or modify resources belonging to other users by smuggling a conflicting value for any path-bound field via the query string or request body. In 'Elixir.GRPC.Server.Transcode':map_request/5 (lib/grpc/server/transcode.ex), all three clauses use Map.merge/2 with path bindings as the first argument, giving them the lowest merge precedence. A request such as GET /users/me/profile?user_id=victim (or a POST with {"user_id": "victim"} when body: "*") yields a decoded protobuf struct where the path-bound field carries the attacker-supplied value rather than the router-extracted value. Any handler that uses the path-bound field for authorization, multi-tenancy scoping, or ownership checks is silently bypassed. This issue affects grpc: from 0.8.0 before 1.0.0. |
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| Metrics |
ssvc
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| Description | Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in elixir-grpc grpc allows authenticated attackers to access or modify resources belonging to other users by smuggling a conflicting value for any path-bound field via the query string or request body. In 'Elixir.GRPC.Server.Transcode':map_request/5 (lib/grpc/server/transcode.ex), all three clauses use Map.merge/2 with path bindings as the first argument, giving them the lowest merge precedence. A request such as GET /users/me/profile?user_id=victim (or a POST with {"user_id": "victim"} when body: "*") yields a decoded protobuf struct where the path-bound field carries the attacker-supplied value rather than the router-extracted value. Any handler that uses the path-bound field for authorization, multi-tenancy scoping, or ownership checks is silently bypassed. This issue affects grpc from 0.8.0 before 1.0.0. | |
| Title | Authorization bypass via path binding override in elixir-grpc/grpc HTTP transcoding | |
| First Time appeared |
Elixir-grpc
Elixir-grpc grpc |
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| Weaknesses | CWE-639 | |
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:elixir-grpc:grpc:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Elixir-grpc
Elixir-grpc grpc |
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| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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