CVE-2026-48100

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{"affected": [{"affectedData": [{"product": "payy", "vendor": "polybase", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "< 1.3.0"}]}], "source": "security-advisories@github.com"}], "cveTags": [], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Payy is an Ethereum L2 zk-rollup for privacy preserving and regulatory compliant transactions. Prior to version 1.3.0, agg_agg forwards the compacted message stream from its inner proofs into a public messages: [Field; 1000] array, but it never checks that the unused tail of the outer array is zero. A registered prover can build a valid agg_final proof for an approved rollup block while inserting an extra burn message after the real messages. RollupV1.verifyRollup() then parses that public input as a normal burn and transfers USDC from the rollup contract to the attacker. This is a severe circuit soundness failure: the proof system accepts a public statement whose messages array is not fully derived from the verified inner proofs. On the current deployment, verifyRollup() is restricted to the existing allowlisted prover, so a fresh public caller cannot submit the invalid proof directly. That gate limits who can reach L1 today; it does not make the circuit statement sound. The issue becomes permissionless under the prover model described in the Payy whitepaper. Section 3.3.2 states: \"To join as a prover, the prover is required to submit a small stake\", and Section 3.3.1 states that if a prover fails to submit, \"other nodes can submit the block proof instead.\" In that model, an attacker only needs to become a registered prover and use public validator approval data for an already approved block. This issue has been patched in version 1.3.0."}], "id": "CVE-2026-48100", "lastModified": "2026-09-30T19:57:08.043", "metrics": {"cvssMetricV40": [{"cvssData": {"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED", "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED", "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackRequirements": "NONE", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "baseScore": 8.7, "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED", "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED", "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE", "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "userInteraction": "NONE", "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED", "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X", "version": "4.0", "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE", "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH", "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"}, "source": "security-advisories@github.com", "type": "Secondary"}], "ssvcV203": [{"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "ssvcData": {"id": "CVE-2026-48100", "options": [{"exploitation": "poc"}, {"automatable": "yes"}, {"technicalImpact": "partial"}], "role": "CISA Coordinator", "timestamp": "2026-09-28T17:20:42.562536Z", "version": "2.0.3"}}]}, "published": "2026-09-28T17:17:49.547", "references": [{"source": "security-advisories@github.com", "url": "https://github.com/polybase/payy/security/advisories/GHSA-fhxc-63vg-9gwr"}, {"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "url": "https://github.com/polybase/payy/security/advisories/GHSA-fhxc-63vg-9gwr"}], "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com", "vulnStatus": "Deferred", "weaknesses": [{"description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-349"}], "source": "security-advisories@github.com", "type": "Secondary"}]}

{}

{"affected": [{"configurations": [{"platform": null, "status": "affected", "versions": {"scheme": "semver", "value": "[0,1.3.0)"}}], "enrichment": {"confidence": 100.0, "confidence_source": "cna", "scores": [{"score": 100.0, "source": "cna"}]}, "original": {"product": "payy", "source": "cna", "vendor": "polybase"}, "product": "payy", "vendor": "polybase"}], "created": "2026-09-28T18:45:05.122538+00:00", "updated": "2026-09-28T19:42:05.971600+00:00", "vendors": ["polybase", "polybase$PRODUCT$payy"]}