CVE-2026-48080

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{"affected": [{"affectedData": [{"product": "appointment-booking-software", "vendor": "open-reception", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "< 1.0.2"}]}], "source": "security-advisories@github.com"}], "cveTags": [], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, the `GET /api/tenants/{id}` endpoint returns the full tenant record to any authenticated `TENANT_ADMIN` of that tenant, including the `databaseUrl` field. This field contains the live PostgreSQL connection string the application uses to connect to that tenant's database. In the tested official `docker-compose.prod.yml` deployment, the connection string contained the user `postgres` with `rolsuper=true` and the plaintext password from `secrets/postgres_password.txt`. Operators who configure a non-superuser PostgreSQL user via `secrets/postgres_user.txt` would expose a less privileged credential, but the disclosure of the connection string itself is independent of that choice. The same credential applies to every database managed by that PostgreSQL instance: the central `appointment_booking` database, every per-tenant database (one per tenant), and the postgres administrative database. A `TENANT_ADMIN` of one tenant who can reach `postgres:5432` (directly via internal network, indirectly via any SSRF, RCE, or file-read in the application) can read every other tenant's appointment ciphertexts, key shares, and metadata; read the central user table, including all `GLOBAL_ADMIN` accounts, password hashes, and session records; modify or delete any data in any tenant database; and/or i a superuser-scoped deployment: use PostgreSQL's `pg_read_server_files`, `COPY ... FROM PROGRAM`, and `CREATE EXTENSION` for further escalation inside the database container. This breaks the per-tenant database isolation that is otherwise the primary cross-tenant control in the application. The application code carefully scopes most queries to the calling tenant's database, but those scopings are irrelevant once the attacker holds the credentials that bypass the application entirely. Version 1.0.2 fixes the issue."}, {"lang": "es", "value": "El software de reserva de citas de OpenReception proporciona una plataforma de reserva de citas cifrada de extremo a extremo. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 1.0.2, el endpoint \u2019GET /api/tenants/{id}\u2019 devuelve el registro completo del inquilino a cualquier \u2019TENANT_ADMIN\u2019 autenticado de ese inquilino, incluyendo el campo \u2019databaseUrl\u2019. Este campo contiene la cadena de conexi\u00f3n activa de PostgreSQL que la aplicaci\u00f3n utiliza para conectarse a la base de datos de ese inquilino. En el despliegue oficial probado de \u2019docker-compose.prod.yml\u2019, la cadena de conexi\u00f3n conten\u00eda el usuario \u2019postgres\u2019 con \u2019rolsuper=true\u2019 y la contrase\u00f1a en texto plano de \u2019secrets/postgres_password.txt\u2019. Los operadores que configuran un usuario de PostgreSQL no superusuario a trav\u00e9s de \u2019secrets/postgres_user.txt\u2019 expondr\u00edan una credencial con menos privilegios, pero la divulgaci\u00f3n de la cadena de conexi\u00f3n en s\u00ed es independiente de esa elecci\u00f3n. La misma credencial se aplica a cada base de datos gestionada por esa instancia de PostgreSQL: la base de datos central \u2019appointment_booking\u2019, cada base de datos por inquilino (una por inquilino) y la base de datos administrativa de postgres. Un \u2019TENANT_ADMIN\u2019 de un inquilino que puede alcanzar \u2019postgres:5432\u2019 (directamente a trav\u00e9s de la red interna, indirectamente a trav\u00e9s de cualquier SSRF, RCE o lectura de archivos en la aplicaci\u00f3n) puede leer los textos cifrados de citas, las claves compartidas y los metadatos de todos los dem\u00e1s inquilinos; leer la tabla central de usuarios, incluyendo todas las cuentas de \u2019GLOBAL_ADMIN\u2019, los hashes de contrase\u00f1as y los registros de sesi\u00f3n; modificar o eliminar cualquier dato en cualquier base de datos de inquilino; y/o i un despliegue con alcance de superusuario: usar \u2019pg_read_server_files\u2019 de PostgreSQL, \u2019COPY ... FROM PROGRAM\u2019 y \u2019CREATE EXTENSION\u2019 para una mayor escalada dentro del contenedor de la base de datos. Esto rompe el aislamiento de la base de datos por inquilino que de otro modo es el control principal entre inquilinos en la aplicaci\u00f3n. El c\u00f3digo de la aplicaci\u00f3n delimita cuidadosamente la mayor\u00eda de las consultas a la base de datos del inquilino que realiza la llamada, pero esas delimitaciones son irrelevantes una vez que el atacante posee las credenciales que eluden la aplicaci\u00f3n por completo. La versi\u00f3n 1.0.2 corrige el problema."}], "id": "CVE-2026-48080", "lastModified": "2026-10-23T21:10:00.157", "metrics": {"cvssMetricV31": [{"cvssData": {"attackComplexity": "HIGH", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.0, "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "HIGH", "scope": "CHANGED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1"}, "exploitabilityScore": 1.3, "impactScore": 6.0, "source": "security-advisories@github.com", "type": "Secondary"}], "ssvcV203": [{"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "ssvcData": {"id": "CVE-2026-48080", "options": [{"exploitation": "poc"}, {"automatable": "no"}, {"technicalImpact": "total"}], "role": "CISA Coordinator", "timestamp": "2026-08-07T17:41:33.078976Z", "version": "2.0.3"}}]}, "published": "2026-08-06T22:17:10.703", "references": [{"source": "security-advisories@github.com", "url": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/ad9e49e3cf66b0cc9a327f6d8a895b23bbd6fea9"}, {"source": "security-advisories@github.com", "url": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-v7fw-6xpm-7gj9"}, {"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "url": "https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-v7fw-6xpm-7gj9"}], "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com", "vulnStatus": "Deferred", "weaknesses": [{"description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-200"}], "source": "security-advisories@github.com", "type": "Secondary"}]}

{}

{"affected": [{"configurations": [{"platform": null, "status": "affected", "versions": {"scheme": "semver", "value": "[0,1.0.2)"}}], "enrichment": {"confidence": 100.0, "confidence_source": "cna", "scores": [{"score": 100.0, "source": "cna"}]}, "original": {"product": "appointment-booking-software", "source": "cna", "vendor": "open-reception"}, "product": "appointment-booking-software", "vendor": "open-reception"}], "created": "2026-08-07T00:45:04.373253+00:00", "updated": "2026-08-07T09:59:12.236295+00:00", "vendors": ["open-reception", "open-reception$PRODUCT$appointment-booking-software"], "weaknesses": ["CWE-200"]}