Botan: directoryName nameConstraint bypass via multi-AVA RDN flattening in matches_dn
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
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| randombit | botan | affected |
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No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
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| Randombit | Botan |
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No CVSS v3.1
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.162% probability within 30 days)
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| Metrics |
ssvc
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| First Time appeared |
Randombit
Randombit botan |
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| Vendors & Products |
Randombit
Randombit botan |
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| Description | Botan is a C++ cryptography library. Prior to 3.13.0, Botan's X.509 Distinguished Name decoder flattens the Attribute-Value Assertions in each Relative Distinguished Name and loses multi-value RDN grouping before DN name-constraint enforcement. An attacker controlling a name-constrained intermediate CA can issue a certificate with a multi-value RDN whose first Common Name matches the permitted constraint and whose second Common Name is attacker-chosen, causing the constraint check to accept the flattened first value. If the certificate contains no subjectAlternativeName extension, the second Common Name can then be accepted as a hostname; Botan does not fall back to Common Name hostname matching when any subjectAlternativeName is present. The exposure is limited to deployments using DN name constraints, which are uncommon outside internal PKIs, and to certificates without a subjectAlternativeName. This issue is fixed in version 3.13.0. | |
| Title | Botan: directoryName nameConstraint bypass via multi-AVA RDN flattening in matches_dn | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-1023 CWE-295 |
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| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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