CVE-2026-48057

Botan: directoryName nameConstraint bypass via multi-AVA RDN flattening in matches_dn

Published Nov 6, 2026 CVSS 4.0 · 2.1 Low EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
Botan is a C++ cryptography library. Prior to 3.13.0, Botan's X.509 Distinguished Name decoder flattens the Attribute-Value Assertions in each Relative Distinguished Name and loses multi-value RDN grouping before DN name-constraint enforcement. An attacker controlling a name-constrained intermediate CA can issue a certificate with a multi-value RDN whose first Common Name matches the permitted constraint and whose second Common Name is attacker-chosen, causing the constraint check to accept the flattened first value. If the certificate contains no subjectAlternativeName extension, the second Common Name can then be accepted as a hostname; Botan does not fall back to Common Name hostname matching when any subjectAlternativeName is present. The exposure is limited to deployments using DN name constraints, which are uncommon outside internal PKIs, and to certificates without a subjectAlternativeName. This issue is fixed in version 3.13.0.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Randombit
Randombit botan
Vendors & Products Randombit
Randombit botan
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Botan is a C++ cryptography library. Prior to 3.13.0, Botan's X.509 Distinguished Name decoder flattens the Attribute-Value Assertions in each Relative Distinguished Name and loses multi-value RDN grouping before DN name-constraint enforcement. An attacker controlling a name-constrained intermediate CA can issue a certificate with a multi-value RDN whose first Common Name matches the permitted constraint and whose second Common Name is attacker-chosen, causing the constraint check to accept the flattened first value. If the certificate contains no subjectAlternativeName extension, the second Common Name can then be accepted as a hostname; Botan does not fall back to Common Name hostname matching when any subjectAlternativeName is present. The exposure is limited to deployments using DN name constraints, which are uncommon outside internal PKIs, and to certificates without a subjectAlternativeName. This issue is fixed in version 3.13.0.
Title Botan: directoryName nameConstraint bypass via multi-AVA RDN flattening in matches_dn
Weaknesses CWE-1023
CWE-295
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 2.1, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N'}

Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
GitHub_M
Published
Updated
Nov 10, 2026, 8:17 PM
Reserved
May 20, 2026, 6:25 PM
Status
Awaiting Analysis
Published
Nov 6, 2026, 10:17 PM
Modified
Nov 12, 2026, 10:18 PM