CVE-2026-47362

Published Aug 7, 2026 CVSS 3.1 · 4.6 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v554-5.9.4, two Room-backed SQLite databases store sensitive content in plaintext: LocalNotificationDatabase (notification title, message, recipient, service, tags, and on-call/incident deep links) and SearchRecentDatabase (the user's full in-app search history).
Impact: Any actor able to bypass the app sandbox can read these databases in plaintext.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record

Tracking

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Advisories

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History
Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Datadog
Datadog android App
Vendors & Products Datadog
Datadog android App
Type Values Removed Values Added
Title Datadog Android App Stores Sensitive Data in Cleartext SQLite Databases
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description The Datadog Android application stores operationally sensitive content in plaintext SQLite databases via Room. Two databases were reviewed: LocalNotificationDatabase (table local_notifications, columns including title, message, recipient, service, tags, and on-call/incident deeplinks) and SearchRecentDatabase (table search_recents, storing every in-app search query the user typed). A repository-wide search for SQLCipher, SupportFactory, openHelperFactory, or any Room encryption configuration returns no matches. Databases are stored as cleartext SQLite files in /data/data/com.datadog.app/databases/. At-rest protection therefore depends solely on the Android application sandbox — the standard Android baseline, adequate for many applications but flagged here as a hardening recommendation because the stored content is operationally sensitive (customer infrastructure monitoring metadata, incident notification recipients, and free-text search queries that may reveal service names, dashboards, and queries of interest). Exploitation paths include rooted or jailbroken devices, adb backup if android:allowBackup is misconfigured for any build flavor, physical-device handover scenarios, and forensic acquisition. In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v554-5.9.4, two Room-backed SQLite databases store sensitive content in plaintext: LocalNotificationDatabase (notification title, message, recipient, service, tags, and on-call/incident deep links) and SearchRecentDatabase (the user's full in-app search history). Impact: Any actor able to bypass the app sandbox can read these databases in plaintext.
Type Values Removed Values Added
Title Datadog Android App Stores Sensitive Data in Cleartext SQLite Databases
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 4.6, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N'}

ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description The Datadog Android application stores operationally sensitive content in plaintext SQLite databases via Room. Two databases were reviewed: LocalNotificationDatabase (table local_notifications, columns including title, message, recipient, service, tags, and on-call/incident deeplinks) and SearchRecentDatabase (table search_recents, storing every in-app search query the user typed). A repository-wide search for SQLCipher, SupportFactory, openHelperFactory, or any Room encryption configuration returns no matches. Databases are stored as cleartext SQLite files in /data/data/com.datadog.app/databases/. At-rest protection therefore depends solely on the Android application sandbox — the standard Android baseline, adequate for many applications but flagged here as a hardening recommendation because the stored content is operationally sensitive (customer infrastructure monitoring metadata, incident notification recipients, and free-text search queries that may reveal service names, dashboards, and queries of interest). Exploitation paths include rooted or jailbroken devices, adb backup if android:allowBackup is misconfigured for any build flavor, physical-device handover scenarios, and forensic acquisition.
Weaknesses CWE-922
References
Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
hackerone
Published
Updated
Aug 8, 2026, 1:05 AM
Reserved
May 19, 2026, 3:00 PM
Status
Awaiting Analysis
Published
Aug 7, 2026, 6:17 PM
Modified
Oct 23, 2026, 8:10 PM