Duck Site: Untrusted pull request code can trigger privileged production deployment
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| duck-organization | duck-site | affected |
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No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Duck-organization | Duck-site |
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No CVSS v3.1
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.387% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Duck-organization
Duck-organization duck-site |
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| Vendors & Products |
Duck-organization
Duck-organization duck-site |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In Duck Site before version 1.0.1, the repository has a deploy workflow that runs after the build workflow completes. The build workflow runs on pull requests, while the deploy workflow runs with package-write permissions and deployment secrets. If an attacker can make a pull request build satisfy the deploy workflow’s main branch condition, the deploy job checks out the triggering workflow commit, builds it into a Docker image, pushes it as latest, and triggers Dokploy deployment. This can allow attacker-controlled pull request code to become the deployed production site image without being merged. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.1. | |
| Title | Duck Site: Untrusted pull request code can trigger privileged production deployment | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-829 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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