Quest Bot: Untrusted pull request code can be built and deployed by privileged `workflow_run` deployment.
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| duck-organization | quest-bot | affected |
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No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Duck-organization | Quest-bot |
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No CVSS v3.1
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.409% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Duck-organization
Duck-organization quest-bot |
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| Vendors & Products |
Duck-organization
Duck-organization quest-bot |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Quest Bot is an opensource modern Discord Bot built for moderation, utilities and support. Prior to version 1.0.3, the repository has a privileged deploy workflow that runs after the unprivileged build workflow completes. The build workflow runs on pull requests, and the deploy workflow checks out the triggering workflow’s head_sha, builds that code into a Docker image, pushes it as latest, and triggers production deployment. If an attacker can open a pull request from a branch named main, the deploy workflow condition can treat the PR build as deployable and build the attacker-controlled commit in a privileged deployment context. This can result in malicious container deployment and production bot compromise. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.3. | |
| Title | Quest Bot: Untrusted pull request code can be built and deployed by privileged `workflow_run` deployment. | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-829 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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