CRLF injection in cookie domain/path options in hackney
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
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| benoitc | hackney | unaffected |
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| benoitc | hackney | unaffected |
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No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
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| Benoitc | Hackney |
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| Benoitc | Hackney |
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| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
Github GHSA |
GHSA-mp55-p8c9-rfw2 | Hackney has CRLF / header injection via unvalidated `domain` and `path` options |
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.425% probability within 30 days)
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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| Metrics |
ssvc
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| Description | Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection') vulnerability in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Response Splitting. The hackney_cookie:setcookie/3 function in src/hackney_cookie.erl validates the Name and Value arguments against CRLF and control characters, but concatenates the domain and path options verbatim into the output iolist with no equivalent check. An attacker who controls either option — for example by supplying a Host header value forwarded as the cookie domain, or a request path forwarded as the cookie path — can inject a literal CRLF sequence and arbitrary additional Set-Cookie headers into the HTTP response. This issue affects hackney: from 0.9.0 before 4.0.1. | |
| Title | CRLF injection in cookie domain/path options in hackney | |
| First Time appeared |
Benoitc
Benoitc hackney |
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| Weaknesses | CWE-93 | |
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:hackney:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Benoitc
Benoitc hackney |
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| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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