Apache MINA: Critical Deserialization Allow-list Bypass via resolveProxyClass - ZDRES-232
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
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| Apache Software Foundation | Apache MINA | unaffected |
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Configuration 1 [-]
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| Apache | Mina |
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| Source | ID | Title |
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Github GHSA |
GHSA-v3pr-hxpr-mfm8 | Apache MINA: Critical Deserialization Allow-list Bypass via resolveProxyClass |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-8465-1 | Apache MINA vulnerabilities |
No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.504% probability within 30 days)
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| Metrics |
ssvc
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| First Time appeared |
Apache
Apache mina |
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| Vendors & Products |
Apache
Apache mina |
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| Description | ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy Assessment: Fully addressed. When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc() is dispatched. JDK then calls the default ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH interface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted classes list . ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes Assessment: Fully addressed. For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s (static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*") , attacker supplies com.myapp.SomeClass ) causes <clinit> of SomeClass — and many real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers Both issues have been fixed. | |
| Title | Apache MINA: Critical Deserialization Allow-list Bypass via resolveProxyClass - ZDRES-232 | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-502 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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