CVE-2026-47065

Apache MINA: Critical Deserialization Allow-list Bypass via resolveProxyClass - ZDRES-232

Published Jun 3, 2026 CVSS 3.1 · 9.8 Critical EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy


Assessment: Fully addressed.


When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker
for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc()
is
dispatched. JDK then calls the default
ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which
performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH
interface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted
classes list .


ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in
readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes


Assessment: Fully addressed.


For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s
(static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an
attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the
developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*") , attacker supplies
com.myapp.SomeClass ) causes <clinit> of SomeClass — and many
real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers


Both issues have been fixed.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record

Tracking

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Advisories

Source ID Title
Github GHSA Github GHSA GHSA-v3pr-hxpr-mfm8 Apache MINA: Critical Deserialization Allow-list Bypass via resolveProxyClass
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8465-1 Apache MINA vulnerabilities
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'yes', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'total'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Apache
Apache mina
Vendors & Products Apache
Apache mina
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy Assessment: Fully addressed. When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc() is dispatched. JDK then calls the default ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH interface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted classes list . ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes Assessment: Fully addressed. For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s (static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*") , attacker supplies com.myapp.SomeClass ) causes <clinit> of SomeClass — and many real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers Both issues have been fixed.
Title Apache MINA: Critical Deserialization Allow-list Bypass via resolveProxyClass - ZDRES-232
Weaknesses CWE-502
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 9.8, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H'}

Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
apache
Published
Updated
Jun 4, 2026, 3:55 AM
Reserved
May 18, 2026, 4:53 PM
Status
Analyzed
Published
Jun 3, 2026, 11:16 AM
Modified
Jul 22, 2026, 7:10 PM