Mailpit has an incomplete fix for GHSA-6jxm: HTML check still permits SSRF to private/loopback/IMDS via missing IP-filter dialer
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
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| axllent | mailpit | affected |
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| Source | ID | Title |
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Github GHSA |
GHSA-j3fj-qppj-fmmc | Mailpit has an incomplete fix for GHSA-6jxm: HTML check still permits SSRF to private/loopback/IMDS via missing IP-filter dialer |
No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.316% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| First Time appeared |
Axllent
Axllent mailpit |
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| Vendors & Products |
Axllent
Axllent mailpit |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| Description | Mailpit is an email testing tool and API for developers. The fix for GHSA-6jxm-fv7w-rw5j (CVE-2026-23845, "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via HTML Check API"), shipped in mailpit `v1.28.3`, hardened `internal/htmlcheck/css.go::downloadCSSToBytes` with a 5MB size cap, a `text/css` content-type check, login-info stripping in `isValidURL`, and an opt-in `--block-remote-css-and-fonts` config flag — but did not add the IP-filtering dialer that the same codebase already uses on the two sister SSRF endpoints (the proxy handler and link-check). Prior to version 1.30.0, `internal/htmlcheck/css.go::newSafeHTTPClient` is mis-named — it builds an `http.Client` whose `Transport.DialContext` calls `net.Dialer.DialContext` directly with no IP allowlisting. As a result, the SSRF originally reported by Bao Anh Phan still permits the server to dial loopback, private, link-local, and any other reserved/multicast range, provided the target replies with `HTTP/200` and a content-type beginning with `text/css`. With redirect-following (`CheckRedirect` allows redirects to any `isValidURL` URL with no IP filter), an attacker-controlled public site can redirect mailpit's request into the private network without ever appearing in the email's HTML. In the default mailpit deploy (no UI auth, no SMTP auth, port 1025/8025 exposed), this is an unauthenticated, network-reachable SSRF triggered by sending an HTML email and then issuing one HTTP `GET` to `/api/v1/message/{id}/html-check`. Version 1.30.0 contains an updated fix. | |
| Title | Mailpit has an incomplete fix for GHSA-6jxm: HTML check still permits SSRF to private/loopback/IMDS via missing IP-filter dialer | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-918 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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