UltraVNC vncauth.c uses time-seeded libc rand() to generate VNC authentication challenge bytes
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| uvnc | UltraVNC | unaffected |
|
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Uvnc | Ultravnc |
|
No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.397% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| References |
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Uvnc
Uvnc ultravnc |
|
| Vendors & Products |
Uvnc
Uvnc ultravnc |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | UltraVNC through 1.8.2.2 uses a cryptographically weak pseudo-random number generator to produce VNC authentication challenge bytes. In rfb/vncauth.c:119-129, the vncRandomBytes() function seeds libc rand() with time(0) + getpid() + rand() and generates a 16-byte challenge. The combined seed space is approximately 31 bits (libc rand() internal state) and is entirely determined by publicly-observable values (wall-clock time and process ID). An attacker who can observe the authentication exchange can enumerate the seed space and predict the challenge within seconds, enabling forgery or offline brute-forcing of responses. Note: on Windows, the active code path may use vncEncryptBytes2.cpp which calls CryptGenRandom; reachability on shipped Windows binaries requires compile-graph verification and is under investigation. | |
| Title | UltraVNC vncauth.c uses time-seeded libc rand() to generate VNC authentication challenge bytes | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-338 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|