CVE-2026-42810

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When it\nlater builds temporary S3 access policies for delegated table access, those\nsame characters appear to be reused unescaped in S3 IAM resource patterns\nand\n`s3:prefix` conditions.\n<br><br>\nIn S3 IAM policy matching, `*` is treated as a wildcard rather than as\nordinary text. That means temporary credentials issued for one crafted table\ncan match the storage path of a different table.\n<br><br>\nIn private testing against Polaris 1.4.0 using Polaris' AWS S3 temporary-\ncredential path on both MinIO and real AWS S3, credentials returned for\ncrafted tables such as `f*.t1`, `f*.*`, `*.*`, and `foo.*` could reach other\ntables' S3 locations.\n<br>\nThe confirmed behavior includes:\n<br>\n- reading another table's metadata control file ([Iceberg metadata JSON]);\n<br>- listing another table's exact S3 table prefix ([table prefix]);\n<br>- and, when write delegation was returned for the crafted table, creating\nand\ndeleting an object under another table's exact S3 table prefix.\n<br><br>\nA control case using ordinary different names did not allow the same\ncross-table access.\n<br><br>\n<span style=\"background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);\">A least-privilege AWS S3 variant was also confirmed in which the attacker\nprincipal had no Polaris permissions on the victim table and only the\nminimal permissions required to create and use a crafted wildcard table\n(namespace-scoped `TABLE_CREATE` and `TABLE_WRITE_DATA` on `*`).</span> In that\nsetup, direct Polaris access to `foo.t1` remained forbidden, but the\nattacker\ncould still create and load `*.*`, receive delegated S3 credentials, and use\nthose credentials to list, read, create, and delete objects under `foo.t1`.\n<br><br>\nIn Iceberg, the metadata JSON file is a control file: it tells readers which\ndata files belong to the table, which snapshots exist, and which table\nversion\nto read. So unauthorized access to it is already a meaningful\nconfidentiality\nproblem. The confirmed write-capable variant means the issue is not limited\nto\ndisclosure.</span><br>"}], "value": "Apache Polaris accepts literal `*` characters in namespace and table names. When it\nlater builds temporary S3 access policies for delegated table access, those\nsame characters appear to be reused unescaped in S3 IAM resource patterns\nand\n`s3:prefix` conditions.\n\n\n\nIn S3 IAM policy matching, `*` is treated as a wildcard rather than as\nordinary text. That means temporary credentials issued for one crafted table\ncan match the storage path of a different table.\n\n\n\nIn private testing against Polaris 1.4.0 using Polaris' AWS S3 temporary-\ncredential path on both MinIO and real AWS S3, credentials returned for\ncrafted tables such as `f*.t1`, `f*.*`, `*.*`, and `foo.*` could reach other\ntables' S3 locations.\n\n\nThe confirmed behavior includes:\n\n\n- reading another table's metadata control file ([Iceberg metadata JSON]);\n\n- listing another table's exact S3 table prefix ([table prefix]);\n\n- and, when write delegation was returned for the crafted table, creating\nand\ndeleting an object under another table's exact S3 table prefix.\n\n\n\nA control case using ordinary different names did not allow the same\ncross-table access.\n\n\n\nA least-privilege AWS S3 variant was also confirmed in which the attacker\nprincipal had no Polaris permissions on the victim table and only the\nminimal permissions required to create and use a crafted wildcard table\n(namespace-scoped `TABLE_CREATE` and `TABLE_WRITE_DATA` on `*`). In that\nsetup, direct Polaris access to `foo.t1` remained forbidden, but the\nattacker\ncould still create and load `*.*`, receive delegated S3 credentials, and use\nthose credentials to list, read, create, and delete objects under `foo.t1`.\n\n\n\nIn Iceberg, the metadata JSON file is a control file: it tells readers which\ndata files belong to the table, which snapshots exist, and which table\nversion\nto read. So unauthorized access to it is already a meaningful\nconfidentiality\nproblem. 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When it\nlater builds temporary S3 access policies for delegated table access, those\nsame characters appear to be reused unescaped in S3 IAM resource patterns\nand\n`s3:prefix` conditions.\n\n\n\nIn S3 IAM policy matching, `*` is treated as a wildcard rather than as\nordinary text. That means temporary credentials issued for one crafted table\ncan match the storage path of a different table.\n\n\n\nIn private testing against Polaris 1.4.0 using Polaris' AWS S3 temporary-\ncredential path on both MinIO and real AWS S3, credentials returned for\ncrafted tables such as `f*.t1`, `f*.*`, `*.*`, and `foo.*` could reach other\ntables' S3 locations.\n\n\nThe confirmed behavior includes:\n\n\n- reading another table's metadata control file ([Iceberg metadata JSON]);\n\n- listing another table's exact S3 table prefix ([table prefix]);\n\n- and, when write delegation was returned for the crafted table, creating\nand\ndeleting an object under another table's exact S3 table prefix.\n\n\n\nA control case using ordinary different names did not allow the same\ncross-table access.\n\n\n\nA least-privilege AWS S3 variant was also confirmed in which the attacker\nprincipal had no Polaris permissions on the victim table and only the\nminimal permissions required to create and use a crafted wildcard table\n(namespace-scoped `TABLE_CREATE` and `TABLE_WRITE_DATA` on `*`). In that\nsetup, direct Polaris access to `foo.t1` remained forbidden, but the\nattacker\ncould still create and load `*.*`, receive delegated S3 credentials, and use\nthose credentials to list, read, create, and delete objects under `foo.t1`.\n\n\n\nIn Iceberg, the metadata JSON file is a control file: it tells readers which\ndata files belong to the table, which snapshots exist, and which table\nversion\nto read. So unauthorized access to it is already a meaningful\nconfidentiality\nproblem. The confirmed write-capable variant means the issue is not limited\nto\ndisclosure.", "supportingMedia": [{"type": "text/html", "value": "<span style=\"background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);\">Apache Polaris accepts literal `*` characters in namespace and table names. When it\nlater builds temporary S3 access policies for delegated table access, those\nsame characters appear to be reused unescaped in S3 IAM resource patterns\nand\n`s3:prefix` conditions.\n<br><br>\nIn S3 IAM policy matching, `*` is treated as a wildcard rather than as\nordinary text. That means temporary credentials issued for one crafted table\ncan match the storage path of a different table.\n<br><br>\nIn private testing against Polaris 1.4.0 using Polaris' AWS S3 temporary-\ncredential path on both MinIO and real AWS S3, credentials returned for\ncrafted tables such as `f*.t1`, `f*.*`, `*.*`, and `foo.*` could reach other\ntables' S3 locations.\n<br>\nThe confirmed behavior includes:\n<br>\n- reading another table's metadata control file ([Iceberg metadata JSON]);\n<br>- listing another table's exact S3 table prefix ([table prefix]);\n<br>- and, when write delegation was returned for the crafted table, creating\nand\ndeleting an object under another table's exact S3 table prefix.\n<br><br>\nA control case using ordinary different names did not allow the same\ncross-table access.\n<br><br>\n<span style=\"background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);\">A least-privilege AWS S3 variant was also confirmed in which the attacker\nprincipal had no Polaris permissions on the victim table and only the\nminimal permissions required to create and use a crafted wildcard table\n(namespace-scoped `TABLE_CREATE` and `TABLE_WRITE_DATA` on `*`).</span> In that\nsetup, direct Polaris access to `foo.t1` remained forbidden, but the\nattacker\ncould still create and load `*.*`, receive delegated S3 credentials, and use\nthose credentials to list, read, create, and delete objects under `foo.t1`.\n<br><br>\nIn Iceberg, the metadata JSON file is a control file: it tells readers which\ndata files belong to the table, which snapshots exist, and which table\nversion\nto read. So unauthorized access to it is already a meaningful\nconfidentiality\nproblem. The confirmed write-capable variant means the issue is not limited\nto\ndisclosure.</span><br>", "base64": false}]}], "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "type": "CWE", "cweId": "CWE-116", "description": "CWE-116 Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output"}]}, {"descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "type": "CWE", "cweId": "CWE-20", "description": "CWE-20 Improper Input Validation"}]}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09", "shortName": "apache", "dateUpdated": "2026-05-04T16:48:49.754Z"}}}, "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-42810", "state": "PUBLISHED", "dateUpdated": "2026-05-04T18:33:09.056Z", "dateReserved": "2026-04-30T14:22:36.663Z", "assignerOrgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09", "datePublished": "2026-05-04T16:48:49.754Z", "assignerShortName": "apache"}, "dataVersion": "5.2"}

{"affected": [{"affectedData": [{"defaultStatus": "unaffected", "product": "Apache Polaris", "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation", "versions": [{"lessThan": "1.4.1", "status": "affected", "version": "0", "versionType": "semver"}]}], "source": "security@apache.org"}], "configurations": [{"nodes": [{"cpeMatch": [{"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:polaris:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "matchCriteriaId": "D5093587-E178-48D3-A30B-04433BC6D047", "versionEndExcluding": "1.4.1", "vulnerable": true}], "negate": false, "operator": "OR"}]}], "cveTags": [], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Apache Polaris accepts literal `*` characters in namespace and table names. When it\nlater builds temporary S3 access policies for delegated table access, those\nsame characters appear to be reused unescaped in S3 IAM resource patterns\nand\n`s3:prefix` conditions.\n\n\n\nIn S3 IAM policy matching, `*` is treated as a wildcard rather than as\nordinary text. That means temporary credentials issued for one crafted table\ncan match the storage path of a different table.\n\n\n\nIn private testing against Polaris 1.4.0 using Polaris' AWS S3 temporary-\ncredential path on both MinIO and real AWS S3, credentials returned for\ncrafted tables such as `f*.t1`, `f*.*`, `*.*`, and `foo.*` could reach other\ntables' S3 locations.\n\n\nThe confirmed behavior includes:\n\n\n- reading another table's metadata control file ([Iceberg metadata JSON]);\n\n- listing another table's exact S3 table prefix ([table prefix]);\n\n- and, when write delegation was returned for the crafted table, creating\nand\ndeleting an object under another table's exact S3 table prefix.\n\n\n\nA control case using ordinary different names did not allow the same\ncross-table access.\n\n\n\nA least-privilege AWS S3 variant was also confirmed in which the attacker\nprincipal had no Polaris permissions on the victim table and only the\nminimal permissions required to create and use a crafted wildcard table\n(namespace-scoped `TABLE_CREATE` and `TABLE_WRITE_DATA` on `*`). In that\nsetup, direct Polaris access to `foo.t1` remained forbidden, but the\nattacker\ncould still create and load `*.*`, receive delegated S3 credentials, and use\nthose credentials to list, read, create, and delete objects under `foo.t1`.\n\n\n\nIn Iceberg, the metadata JSON file is a control file: it tells readers which\ndata files belong to the table, which snapshots exist, and which table\nversion\nto read. So unauthorized access to it is already a meaningful\nconfidentiality\nproblem. The confirmed write-capable variant means the issue is not limited\nto\ndisclosure."}, {"lang": "es", "value": "Apache Polaris acepta caracteres literales \u2019*\u2019 en nombres de espacios de nombres y tablas. Cuando posteriormente construye pol\u00edticas de acceso temporales de S3 para acceso delegado a tablas, esos mismos caracteres parecen ser reutilizados sin escapar en patrones de recursos de S3 IAM y condiciones \u2019s3:prefix\u2019.\n\nEn la coincidencia de pol\u00edticas de S3 IAM, \u2019*\u2019 es tratado como un comod\u00edn en lugar de como texto ordinario. Eso significa que las credenciales temporales emitidas para una tabla manipulada pueden coincidir con la ruta de almacenamiento de una tabla diferente.\n\nEn pruebas privadas contra Polaris 1.4.0 utilizando la ruta de credenciales temporales de AWS S3 de Polaris tanto en MinIO como en AWS S3 real, las credenciales devueltas para tablas manipuladas como \u2019f.t1\u2019, \u2019f.*\u2019, \u2019*.*\u2019 y \u2019foo.*\u2019 pod\u00edan alcanzar las ubicaciones S3 de otras tablas.\n\nEl comportamiento confirmado incluye:\n\n- leer el archivo de control de metadatos de otra tabla ([JSON de metadatos de Iceberg]);\n\n- listar el prefijo exacto de la tabla S3 de otra tabla ([prefijo de tabla]);\n\n- y, cuando se devolvi\u00f3 la delegaci\u00f3n de escritura para la tabla manipulada, crear y eliminar un objeto bajo el prefijo exacto de la tabla S3 de otra tabla.\n\nUn caso de control utilizando nombres diferentes ordinarios no permiti\u00f3 el mismo acceso entre tablas.\n\nTambi\u00e9n se confirm\u00f3 una variante de AWS S3 de m\u00ednimo privilegio en la que el principal atacante no ten\u00eda permisos de Polaris en la tabla v\u00edctima y solo los permisos m\u00ednimos requeridos para crear y usar una tabla comod\u00edn manipulada (con \u00e1mbito de espacio de nombres \u2019TABLE_CREATE\u2019 y \u2019TABLE_WRITE_DATA\u2019 en \u2019*\u2019). En esa configuraci\u00f3n, el acceso directo de Polaris a \u2019foo.t1\u2019 permaneci\u00f3 prohibido, pero el atacante a\u00fan pod\u00eda crear y cargar \u2019*.*\u2019, recibir credenciales S3 delegadas y usar esas credenciales para listar, leer, crear y eliminar objetos bajo \u2019foo.t1\u2019.\n\nEn Iceberg, el archivo JSON de metadatos es un archivo de control: les dice a los lectores qu\u00e9 archivos de datos pertenecen a la tabla, qu\u00e9 instant\u00e1neas existen y qu\u00e9 versi\u00f3n de la tabla leer. Por lo tanto, el acceso no autorizado a este ya es un problema significativo de confidencialidad. La variante confirmada con capacidad de escritura significa que el problema no se limita a la divulgaci\u00f3n."}], "id": "CVE-2026-42810", "lastModified": "2026-10-26T19:10:00.163", "metrics": {"cvssMetricV31": [{"cvssData": {"attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.9, "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1"}, "exploitabilityScore": 3.1, "impactScore": 6.0, "source": "security@apache.org", "type": "Secondary"}], "cvssMetricV40": [{"cvssData": {"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED", "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED", "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackRequirements": "NONE", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "baseScore": 9.4, "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED", "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED", "subAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH", "subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH", "userInteraction": "NONE", "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED", "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X", "version": "4.0", "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH", "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH", "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"}, "source": "security@apache.org", "type": "Secondary"}], "ssvcV203": [{"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "ssvcData": {"id": "CVE-2026-42810", "options": [{"exploitation": "none"}, {"automatable": "no"}, {"technicalImpact": "total"}], "role": "CISA Coordinator", "timestamp": "2026-05-04T18:32:53.859435Z", "version": "2.0.3"}}]}, "published": "2026-05-04T17:16:26.493", "references": [{"source": "security@apache.org", "tags": ["Mailing List", "Vendor Advisory"], "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/gg3qq9sqg4hdjmprqy46p40xmln61dm9"}, {"source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108", "tags": ["Mailing List", "Third Party Advisory"], "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/02/11"}], "sourceIdentifier": "security@apache.org", "vulnStatus": "Analyzed", "weaknesses": [{"description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-20"}, {"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-116"}], "source": "security@apache.org", "type": "Secondary"}]}

{}

{"affected": [{"configurations": [{"platform": null, "status": "affected", "versions": {"scheme": "semver", "value": "[0,1.4.1)"}}], "enrichment": {"confidence": 95.0, "confidence_source": "inferred", "scores": [{"score": 95.0, "source": "inferred"}]}, "product": "polaris", "vendor": "apache"}], "created": "2026-05-04T18:30:06.105114+00:00", "updated": "2026-05-04T19:44:00.895607+00:00", "vendors": ["apache", "apache$PRODUCT$polaris"]}