apko doesn't verify downloaded apk packages against APKINDEX checksum (package substitution possible)
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
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| chainguard-dev | apko | affected |
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| Chainguard-dev | Apko |
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| Source | ID | Title |
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Github GHSA |
GHSA-hcwr-pq9g-rq3m | apko doesn't verify downloaded apk packages against APKINDEX checksum (package substitution possible) |
No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.159% probability within 30 days)
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| Metrics |
ssvc
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| First Time appeared |
Chainguard-dev
Chainguard-dev apko |
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| Vendors & Products |
Chainguard-dev
Chainguard-dev apko |
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| Description | apko allows users to build and publish OCI container images built from apk packages. Prior to version 1.2.7, apko verifies the signature on APKINDEX.tar.gz but never compares individually downloaded .apk packages against the checksum recorded in the signed index. The checksum is parsed and available via ChecksumString(), and the downloaded package control hash is computed, but the two values are never compared in getPackageImpl(). Mismatched packages are silently accepted. An attacker who can substitute download responses (compromised mirror, HTTP repository, poisoned CDN cache) can install arbitrary packages into built images. This issue has been patched in version 1.2.7. | |
| Title | apko doesn't verify downloaded apk packages against APKINDEX checksum (package substitution possible) | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-345 CWE-494 |
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| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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