LangChain: HTMLHeaderTextSplitter.split_text_from_url SSRF Redirect Bypass
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
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| langchain-ai | langchain-text-splitters | affected |
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| Langchain-ai | Langchain-text-splitters |
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| Source | ID | Title |
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Github GHSA |
GHSA-fv5p-p927-qmxr | LangChain Text Splitters: HTMLHeaderTextSplitter.split_text_from_url SSRF Redirect Bypass |
No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.260% probability within 30 days)
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| First Time appeared |
Langchain
Langchain langchain-text-splitters |
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| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:langchain:langchain-text-splitters:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Langchain
Langchain langchain-text-splitters |
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| Metrics |
threat_severity
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threat_severity
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| First Time appeared |
Langchain-ai
Langchain-ai langchain-text-splitters |
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| Vendors & Products |
Langchain-ai
Langchain-ai langchain-text-splitters |
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ssvc
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| Description | LangChain is a framework for building agents and LLM-powered applications. Prior to langchain-text-splitters 1.1.2, HTMLHeaderTextSplitter.split_text_from_url() validated the initial URL using validate_safe_url() but then performed the fetch with requests.get() with redirects enabled (the default). Because redirect targets were not revalidated, a URL pointing to an attacker-controlled server could redirect to internal, localhost, or cloud metadata endpoints, bypassing SSRF protections. The response body is parsed and returned as Document objects to the calling application code. Whether this constitutes a data exfiltration path depends on the application: if it exposes Document contents (or derivatives) back to the requester who supplied the URL, sensitive data from internal endpoints could be leaked. Applications that store or process Documents internally without returning raw content to the requester are not directly exposed to data exfiltration through this issue. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.1.2. | |
| Title | LangChain: HTMLHeaderTextSplitter.split_text_from_url SSRF Redirect Bypass | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-918 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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