Cacti: Open Redirect via HTTP_REFERER substring check in auth_login_redirect
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
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| Cacti | cacti | affected |
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No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cacti | Cacti |
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No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.257% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| Metrics |
ssvc
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Cacti
Cacti cacti |
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| Vendors & Products |
Cacti
Cacti cacti |
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| Description | Cacti is an open source performance and fault management framework. Versions 1.2.30 and prior are vulnerable to Open Redirect through a substring check rather than a host check at str_contains($referer, CACTI_PATH_URL). When the user's login_opts == '1' (redirect to referer after login), the function used $_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER'] directly. An attacker could craft a referer such as https://evil.com/cacti/. Where CACTI_PATH_URL is /cacti/, the substring matches and the user is redirected to evil.com after login. The pre-existing validate_redirect_url() helper at lib/html_utility.php performed proper validation but was not invoked from auth_login_redirect(). This issue has been fixed in version 1.2.31. | |
| Title | Cacti: Open Redirect via HTTP_REFERER substring check in auth_login_redirect | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-601 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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