twenty-server SSRF protection bypass via IPv4-mapped IPv6 address normalization
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| twentyhq | twenty | affected |
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No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Twenty | Twenty |
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No CVSS v3.1
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.240% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Twenty
Twenty twenty |
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| Vendors & Products |
Twenty
Twenty twenty |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Twenty is an open source CRM built with NestJS (Node.js). In versions 1.18.0 and earlier, the SSRF protection in twenty-server's SecureHttpClientService can be bypassed using IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses in URL IP literals. Node.js's URL parser normalizes IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses to compressed hex form (e.g., ::ffff:169.254.169.254 becomes ::ffff:a9fe:a9fe), but the isPrivateIp utility only recognizes the dotted-decimal notation. As a result, the hex form passes the SSRF check unchecked. Additionally, the socket lookup validation event does not fire for IP literal addresses, bypassing the second validation layer. An authenticated user can reach any internal IP, including cloud metadata endpoints, to exfiltrate credentials such as IAM keys. | |
| Title | twenty-server SSRF protection bypass via IPv4-mapped IPv6 address normalization | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-918 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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