Improper key_share validation in TLS 1.3 HelloRetryRequest
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| wolfSSL | wolfSSL | unaffected |
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No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wolfssl | Wolfssl |
|
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.222% probability within 30 days)
| Link | Providers |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/pull/9754 |
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:wolfssl:wolfssl:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Wolfssl
Wolfssl wolfssl |
|
| Vendors & Products |
Wolfssl
Wolfssl wolfssl |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Missing required cryptographic step in the TLS 1.3 client HelloRetryRequest handshake logic in wolfSSL could lead to a compromise in the confidentiality of TLS-protected communications via a crafted HelloRetryRequest followed by a ServerHello message that omits the required key_share extension, resulting in derivation of predictable traffic secrets from (EC)DHE shared secret. This issue does not affect the client's authentication of the server during TLS handshakes. | |
| Title | Improper key_share validation in TLS 1.3 HelloRetryRequest | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-20 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
|