CVE-2026-24904

TrustTunnel has `client_random_prefix` rule bypass via fragmented or partial TLS ClientHello

Published Jan 29, 2026 CVSS 3.1 · 5.3 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
TrustTunnel is an open-source VPN protocol with a rule bypass issue in versions prior to 0.9.115. In `tls_listener.rs`, `TlsListener::listen()` peeks 1024 bytes and calls `extract_client_random(...)`. If `parse_tls_plaintext` fails (for example, a fragmented/partial ClientHello split across TCP writes), `extract_client_random` returns `None`. In `rules.rs`, `RulesEngine::evaluate` only evaluates `client_random_prefix` when `client_random` is `Some(...)`. As a result, when extraction fails (`client_random == None`), any rule that relies on `client_random_prefix` matching is skipped and evaluation falls through to later rules. As an important semantics note: `client_random_prefix` is a match condition only. It does not mean "block non-matching prefixes" by itself. A rule with `client_random_prefix = ...` triggers its `action` only when the prefix matches (and the field is available to evaluate). Non-matches (or `None`) simply do not match that rule and continue to fall through. The vulnerability is fixed in version 0.9.115.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record

Tracking

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Advisories

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History
Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Adguard
Adguard trusttunnel
CPEs cpe:2.3:a:adguard:trusttunnel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Adguard
Adguard trusttunnel
Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Trusttunnel
Trusttunnel trusttunnel
Vendors & Products Trusttunnel
Trusttunnel trusttunnel
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'yes', 'Exploitation': 'poc', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description TrustTunnel is an open-source VPN protocol with a rule bypass issue in versions prior to 0.9.115. In `tls_listener.rs`, `TlsListener::listen()` peeks 1024 bytes and calls `extract_client_random(...)`. If `parse_tls_plaintext` fails (for example, a fragmented/partial ClientHello split across TCP writes), `extract_client_random` returns `None`. In `rules.rs`, `RulesEngine::evaluate` only evaluates `client_random_prefix` when `client_random` is `Some(...)`. As a result, when extraction fails (`client_random == None`), any rule that relies on `client_random_prefix` matching is skipped and evaluation falls through to later rules. As an important semantics note: `client_random_prefix` is a match condition only. It does not mean "block non-matching prefixes" by itself. A rule with `client_random_prefix = ...` triggers its `action` only when the prefix matches (and the field is available to evaluate). Non-matches (or `None`) simply do not match that rule and continue to fall through. The vulnerability is fixed in version 0.9.115.
Title TrustTunnel has `client_random_prefix` rule bypass via fragmented or partial TLS ClientHello
Weaknesses CWE-284
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 5.3, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N'}

Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
GitHub_M
Published
Updated
Jan 29, 2026, 9:34 PM
Reserved
Jan 27, 2026, 7:35 PM
Status
Analyzed
Published
Jan 29, 2026, 10:15 PM
Modified
Jun 17, 2026, 10:23 AM