CVE-2026-18092
Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass via XML signature wrapping because new_from_xml reads assertion identity with document-wide XPath instead of the signed subtree
Published Aug 3, 2026
CVSS 3.1 · 8.1 High
EPSS < 1%
KEV · Not listed
Description
Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass via XML signature wrapping because new_from_xml reads assertion identity with document-wide XPath instead of the signed subtree.
new_from_xml reads the NameID, attribute values, SessionIndex, audience and other identity fields with document-wide XPath, such as //saml:Assertion/saml:AttributeStatement/saml:Attribute and //saml:Subject/saml:NameID, which select the first matching element in document order rather than the element covered by the verified signature. handle_response confirms that a signature is present and, when a cacert is configured, that it chains to the CA, but XML::Sig verifies only the element named by the signature's Reference URI, so unsigned sibling assertions in the same document are not covered. An attacker who holds any one IdP-signed assertion can add an unsigned attacker-authored assertion earlier in document order; the signature still verifies and the document-order XPath returns the attacker's NameID and attributes.
Any caller that passes an untrusted Response to new_from_xml can accept identity fields from an assertion the IdP never signed, even when a cacert trust anchor is configured, so a party holding one valid IdP-signed assertion can authenticate as an arbitrary user.
new_from_xml reads the NameID, attribute values, SessionIndex, audience and other identity fields with document-wide XPath, such as //saml:Assertion/saml:AttributeStatement/saml:Attribute and //saml:Subject/saml:NameID, which select the first matching element in document order rather than the element covered by the verified signature. handle_response confirms that a signature is present and, when a cacert is configured, that it chains to the CA, but XML::Sig verifies only the element named by the signature's Reference URI, so unsigned sibling assertions in the same document are not covered. An attacker who holds any one IdP-signed assertion can add an unsigned attacker-authored assertion earlier in document order; the signature still verifies and the document-order XPath returns the attacker's NameID and attributes.
Any caller that passes an untrusted Response to new_from_xml can accept identity fields from an assertion the IdP never signed, even when a cacert trust anchor is configured, so a party holding one valid IdP-signed assertion can authenticate as an arbitrary user.
Affected Products
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CVE record
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NVD configurations
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Red Hat packages
No data
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OpenCVE enrichment
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
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| TIMLEGGE | Net::SAML2 | unaffected |
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No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Timlegge | Net::saml2 |
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Remediation
Vendor Solution
Upgrade to Net::SAML2 0.86 or later, which anchors identity extraction at the assertion subtree covered by a signature that validates against the configured trust anchor.
Tracking
Advisories
Metrics
No CVSS v4.0
Attack Vector Network
Attack Complexity Low
Privileges Required None
Scope Unchanged
Confidentiality Impact None
Integrity Impact High
Availability Impact High
User Interaction Required
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.337% probability within 30 days)
Exploitation none
Automatable no
Technical Impact partial
References
History
Aug 3, 2026 8:30 PM
Scoring metrics updated
View changes
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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Aug 3, 2026 4:15 PM
First appearance in the feed. Affected vendors updated
View changes
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Timlegge
Timlegge net::saml2 |
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| Vendors & Products |
Timlegge
Timlegge net::saml2 |
Aug 3, 2026 1:45 PM
Description updated. Title updated. Weaknesses updated. Added references
View changes
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass via XML signature wrapping because new_from_xml reads assertion identity with document-wide XPath instead of the signed subtree. new_from_xml reads the NameID, attribute values, SessionIndex, audience and other identity fields with document-wide XPath, such as //saml:Assertion/saml:AttributeStatement/saml:Attribute and //saml:Subject/saml:NameID, which select the first matching element in document order rather than the element covered by the verified signature. handle_response confirms that a signature is present and, when a cacert is configured, that it chains to the CA, but XML::Sig verifies only the element named by the signature's Reference URI, so unsigned sibling assertions in the same document are not covered. An attacker who holds any one IdP-signed assertion can add an unsigned attacker-authored assertion earlier in document order; the signature still verifies and the document-order XPath returns the attacker's NameID and attributes. Any caller that passes an untrusted Response to new_from_xml can accept identity fields from an assertion the IdP never signed, even when a cacert trust anchor is configured, so a party holding one valid IdP-signed assertion can authenticate as an arbitrary user. | |
| Title | Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass via XML signature wrapping because new_from_xml reads assertion identity with document-wide XPath instead of the signed subtree | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-347 | |
| References |
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Weaknesses
