CVE-2026-18040

HQC leaks private key information through secret-indexed GF(2^8) tables and a secret-dependent fixed-weight sampler

Published Oct 3, 2026 CVSS 4.0 · 5.9 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, HQC leaked secret-derived data through two side channels: its GF(2^8) arithmetic used lookup tables indexed by field elements, making the cache line touched a function of the operand, and its fixed-weight support sampler left its duplicate scan as soon as a collision was found and stored accepted positions at a secret index. Both run on secret inputs during encapsulation and decapsulation, and the sampler re-expands the secret key from its seed on every decapsulation, so an attacker able to observe cache behaviour or decapsulation timing can recover information about the HQC private key. The field arithmetic is now table-free and the sampler branch-free within a batch of candidates, with output and randomness consumption unchanged.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Legion Of The Bouncy Castle Inc.
Legion Of The Bouncy Castle Inc. bc-java
Vendors & Products Legion Of The Bouncy Castle Inc.
Legion Of The Bouncy Castle Inc. bc-java
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, HQC leaked secret-derived data through two side channels: its GF(2^8) arithmetic used lookup tables indexed by field elements, making the cache line touched a function of the operand, and its fixed-weight support sampler left its duplicate scan as soon as a collision was found and stored accepted positions at a secret index. Both run on secret inputs during encapsulation and decapsulation, and the sampler re-expands the secret key from its seed on every decapsulation, so an attacker able to observe cache behaviour or decapsulation timing can recover information about the HQC private key. The field arithmetic is now table-free and the sampler branch-free within a batch of candidates, with output and randomness consumption unchanged.
Title HQC leaks private key information through secret-indexed GF(2^8) tables and a secret-dependent fixed-weight sampler
Weaknesses CWE-208
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 5.9, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/U:Amber'}

Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
bcorg
Published
Updated
Oct 5, 2026, 4:00 PM
Reserved
Jul 28, 2026, 8:50 AM
Status
Awaiting Analysis
Published
Oct 3, 2026, 9:17 AM
Modified
Oct 6, 2026, 2:49 PM