CVE-2026-17349

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When a non-owner triggered an adhoc connect against another user's (in practice, typically an administrator's) shared server, the clone inherited that user's ownership, shared flag, and stored database credentials verbatim. pgAdmin persisted this cross-tenant, credential-bearing server row before the connection was even attempted, so it survived even when the connection subsequently failed. The non-owner could then open the newly-owned clone and pgAdmin would connect using the source user's stored database password on the non-owner's behalf, granting the non-owner use of database credentials -- and whatever database privileges they confer -- that were never their own.\n\nFix forces the cloned adhoc record's ownership fields (user_id, shared, shared_username) and stored credential fields (password, save_password, tunnel_password) to belong to the calling user and be cleared/private before committing, regardless of the source server's ownership, sharing state, or stored credentials. A regression test asserts that an adhoc connect triggered by a non-owner against another user's shared server persists a row owned by the caller, not shared, and without the source's stored credentials.\n\nThis issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 9.0 before 9.17."}], "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10200", "tags": ["issue-tracking"]}, {"url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/a7e74a6ed685bc34e1f77a8b6a94d00fa3dff815", "tags": ["related"]}, {"url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/64a9cdbd6a240a962144f84418beaf9e66419779", "tags": ["patch"]}], "metrics": [{"format": "CVSS", "scenarios": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Threat model: an authenticated, low-privilege pgAdmin user who knows or can enumerate the server id of another user's (e.g. an administrator's) shared server row triggers an adhoc connect against it. No special privilege beyond ordinary authenticated access is needed, and no interaction from the victim is required. Scope is Changed: the attacker's own pgAdmin authorization does not itself grant use of the source user's stored database credentials, so gaining and using those credentials crosses into another user's security authority -- specifically the database privileges the source user's stored credentials confer, which may substantially exceed the attacker's own. Confidentiality and Integrity are High because the attacker obtains a working, reusable database credential and can use it to read/write whatever the source user's database role permits. Availability is None: the leak itself does not directly cause denial of service."}], "cvssV3_1": {"version": "3.1", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "userInteraction": "NONE", "scope": "CHANGED", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "baseScore": 9.6, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N"}}, {"format": "CVSS", "scenarios": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Same reasoning as the CVSS 3.1 entry: an authenticated low-privilege user obtains another user's stored database credential via server cloning, without any interaction from the victim. VC:H/VI:H for pgAdmin's own scope (the leaked credential itself); SC:H/SI:H because the credential is then usable against the underlying database server, a subsequent system whose privileges may substantially exceed the attacker's own. VA:N/SA:N since the leak alone does not cause denial of service."}], "cvssV4_0": {"version": "4.0", "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N", "baseScore": 9.3, "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL"}}], "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "description": "CWE-639 Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "cweId": "CWE-639", "type": "CWE"}, {"lang": "en", "description": "CWE-522 Insufficiently Protected Credentials", "cweId": "CWE-522", "type": "CWE"}]}], "credits": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Ashesh Vashi <ashesh.vashi@enterprisedb.com>", "type": "finder"}, {"lang": "en", "value": "Ashesh Vashi <ashesh.vashi@enterprisedb.com>", "type": "remediation developer"}, {"lang": "en", "value": "Kundan Sable <kundan.sable@enterprisedb.com>", "type": "remediation reviewer"}], "source": {"discovery": "INTERNAL"}}, "adp": [{"metrics": [{"other": {"type": "ssvc", "content": {"timestamp": "2026-07-31T00:00:00+00:00", "options": [{"Exploitation": "none"}, {"Automatable": "no"}, {"Technical Impact": "total"}], "role": "CISA Coordinator", "version": "2.0.3", "id": "CVE-2026-17349"}}}], "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment", "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "shortName": "CISA-ADP", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-01T03:56:26.176Z"}}]}}

{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "containers": {"adp": [{"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment", "metrics": [{"other": {"type": "ssvc", "content": {"id": "CVE-2026-17349", "role": "CISA Coordinator", "options": [{"Exploitation": "none"}, {"Automatable": "no"}, {"Technical Impact": "total"}], "version": "2.0.3", "timestamp": "2026-07-31T17:21:38.095146Z"}}}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "shortName": "CISA-ADP", "dateUpdated": "2026-07-31T17:21:46.538Z"}}], "cna": {"title": "pgAdmin 4: Adhoc server clone leaks another user's stored database credentials and ownership to a non-owner", "source": {"discovery": "INTERNAL"}, "credits": [{"lang": "en", "type": "finder", "value": "Ashesh Vashi <ashesh.vashi@enterprisedb.com>"}, {"lang": "en", "type": "remediation developer", "value": "Ashesh Vashi <ashesh.vashi@enterprisedb.com>"}, {"lang": "en", "type": "remediation reviewer", "value": "Kundan Sable <kundan.sable@enterprisedb.com>"}], "metrics": [{"format": "CVSS", "cvssV3_1": {"scope": "CHANGED", "version": "3.1", "baseScore": 9.6, "attackVector": "NETWORK", "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "userInteraction": "NONE", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH"}, "scenarios": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Threat model: an authenticated, low-privilege pgAdmin user who knows or can enumerate the server id of another user's (e.g. an administrator's) shared server row triggers an adhoc connect against it. No special privilege beyond ordinary authenticated access is needed, and no interaction from the victim is required. Scope is Changed: the attacker's own pgAdmin authorization does not itself grant use of the source user's stored database credentials, so gaining and using those credentials crosses into another user's security authority -- specifically the database privileges the source user's stored credentials confer, which may substantially exceed the attacker's own. Confidentiality and Integrity are High because the attacker obtains a working, reusable database credential and can use it to read/write whatever the source user's database role permits. Availability is None: the leak itself does not directly cause denial of service."}]}, {"format": "CVSS", "cvssV4_0": {"version": "4.0", "baseScore": 9.3, "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N"}, "scenarios": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Same reasoning as the CVSS 3.1 entry: an authenticated low-privilege user obtains another user's stored database credential via server cloning, without any interaction from the victim. VC:H/VI:H for pgAdmin's own scope (the leaked credential itself); SC:H/SI:H because the credential is then usable against the underlying database server, a subsequent system whose privileges may substantially exceed the attacker's own. VA:N/SA:N since the leak alone does not cause denial of service."}]}], "affected": [{"repo": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4", "vendor": "pgadmin.org", "modules": ["Workspaces"], "product": "pgAdmin 4", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "9.0", "lessThan": "9.17", "versionType": "custom"}], "programFiles": ["https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/misc/workspaces/__init__.py"], "defaultStatus": "unaffected"}], "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10200", "tags": ["issue-tracking"]}, {"url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/a7e74a6ed685bc34e1f77a8b6a94d00fa3dff815", "tags": ["related"]}, {"url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/64a9cdbd6a240a962144f84418beaf9e66419779", "tags": ["patch"]}], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "/misc/workspace/adhoc_connect_server, part of the Workspaces feature introduced in pgAdmin 4 9.0, when passed the id of an existing server, clones that server via Server.clone(), which copies every column from the source row, including user_id, shared, shared_username, and the stored credential fields password, save_password, and tunnel_password. When a non-owner triggered an adhoc connect against another user's (in practice, typically an administrator's) shared server, the clone inherited that user's ownership, shared flag, and stored database credentials verbatim. pgAdmin persisted this cross-tenant, credential-bearing server row before the connection was even attempted, so it survived even when the connection subsequently failed. The non-owner could then open the newly-owned clone and pgAdmin would connect using the source user's stored database password on the non-owner's behalf, granting the non-owner use of database credentials -- and whatever database privileges they confer -- that were never their own.\n\nFix forces the cloned adhoc record's ownership fields (user_id, shared, shared_username) and stored credential fields (password, save_password, tunnel_password) to belong to the calling user and be cleared/private before committing, regardless of the source server's ownership, sharing state, or stored credentials. A regression test asserts that an adhoc connect triggered by a non-owner against another user's shared server persists a row owned by the caller, not shared, and without the source's stored credentials.\n\nThis issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 9.0 before 9.17."}], "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "type": "CWE", "cweId": "CWE-639", "description": "CWE-639 Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key"}, {"lang": "en", "type": "CWE", "cweId": "CWE-522", "description": "CWE-522 Insufficiently Protected Credentials"}]}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007", "shortName": "PostgreSQL", "dateUpdated": "2026-07-31T15:59:47.841Z"}}}, "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-17349", "state": "PUBLISHED", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-01T03:56:26.176Z", "dateReserved": "2026-07-25T02:52:56.082Z", "assignerOrgId": "f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007", "datePublished": "2026-07-31T15:59:47.841Z", "assignerShortName": "PostgreSQL"}, "dataVersion": "5.2"}

{"affected": [{"affectedData": [{"defaultStatus": "unaffected", "modules": ["Workspaces"], "product": "pgAdmin 4", "programFiles": ["https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/misc/workspaces/__init__.py"], "repo": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4", "vendor": "pgadmin.org", "versions": [{"lessThan": "9.17", "status": "affected", "version": "9.0", "versionType": "custom"}]}], "source": "f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007"}], "configurations": [{"nodes": [{"cpeMatch": [{"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:pgadmin:pgadmin_4:*:*:*:*:*:postgresql:*:*", "matchCriteriaId": "19055EF1-2717-4422-BC50-4D5764612CC8", "versionEndExcluding": "9.17", "versionStartIncluding": "9.0", "vulnerable": true}], "negate": false, "operator": "OR"}]}], "cveTags": [], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "/misc/workspace/adhoc_connect_server, part of the Workspaces feature introduced in pgAdmin 4 9.0, when passed the id of an existing server, clones that server via Server.clone(), which copies every column from the source row, including user_id, shared, shared_username, and the stored credential fields password, save_password, and tunnel_password. When a non-owner triggered an adhoc connect against another user's (in practice, typically an administrator's) shared server, the clone inherited that user's ownership, shared flag, and stored database credentials verbatim. pgAdmin persisted this cross-tenant, credential-bearing server row before the connection was even attempted, so it survived even when the connection subsequently failed. The non-owner could then open the newly-owned clone and pgAdmin would connect using the source user's stored database password on the non-owner's behalf, granting the non-owner use of database credentials -- and whatever database privileges they confer -- that were never their own.\n\nFix forces the cloned adhoc record's ownership fields (user_id, shared, shared_username) and stored credential fields (password, save_password, tunnel_password) to belong to the calling user and be cleared/private before committing, regardless of the source server's ownership, sharing state, or stored credentials. A regression test asserts that an adhoc connect triggered by a non-owner against another user's shared server persists a row owned by the caller, not shared, and without the source's stored credentials.\n\nThis issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 9.0 before 9.17."}, {"lang": "es", "value": "/misc/workspace/adhoc_connect_server, parte de la caracter\u00edstica Workspaces introducida en pgAdmin 4 9.0, cuando se le pasa el ID de un servidor existente, clona ese servidor a trav\u00e9s de Server.clone(), lo que copia cada columna de la fila de origen, incluyendo user_id, shared, shared_username, y los campos de credenciales almacenadas password, save_password, y tunnel_password. Cuando un no-propietario activaba una conexi\u00f3n ad-hoc contra el servidor compartido de otro usuario (en la pr\u00e1ctica, t\u00edpicamente de un administrador), el clon heredaba la propiedad de ese usuario, el indicador de compartido, y las credenciales de la base de datos almacenadas textualmente. pgAdmin persist\u00eda esta fila de servidor entre inquilinos y portadora de credenciales antes de que la conexi\u00f3n fuera siquiera intentada, por lo que sobreviv\u00eda incluso cuando la conexi\u00f3n fallaba posteriormente. El no-propietario pod\u00eda entonces abrir el clon reci\u00e9n adquirido y pgAdmin se conectar\u00eda usando la contrase\u00f1a de la base de datos almacenada del usuario de origen en nombre del no-propietario, otorgando al no-propietario el uso de credenciales de la base de datos -- y cualesquiera privilegios de la base de datos que estas confieran -- que nunca fueron suyas.\n\nLa correcci\u00f3n fuerza que los campos de propiedad del registro ad-hoc clonado (user_id, shared, shared_username) y los campos de credenciales almacenadas (password, save_password, tunnel_password) pertenezcan al usuario que realiza la llamada y se borren/privaticen antes de la confirmaci\u00f3n, independientemente de la propiedad del servidor de origen, el estado de compartido o las credenciales almacenadas. Una prueba de regresi\u00f3n afirma que una conexi\u00f3n ad-hoc activada por un no-propietario contra el servidor compartido de otro usuario persiste una fila propiedad del llamador, no compartida, y sin las credenciales almacenadas del origen.\n\nEste problema afecta a pgAdmin 4: desde 9.0 antes de 9.17."}], "id": "CVE-2026-17349", "lastModified": "2026-10-23T23:10:00.157", "metrics": {"cvssMetricV31": [{"cvssData": {"attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.6, "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N", "version": "3.1"}, "exploitabilityScore": 3.1, "impactScore": 5.8, "source": "f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007", "type": "Secondary"}], "cvssMetricV40": [{"cvssData": {"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED", "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED", "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackRequirements": "NONE", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "baseScore": 9.3, "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED", "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED", "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH", "userInteraction": "NONE", "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED", "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X", "version": "4.0", "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH", "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"}, "source": "f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007", "type": "Secondary"}], "ssvcV203": [{"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "ssvcData": {"id": "CVE-2026-17349", "options": [{"exploitation": "none"}, {"automatable": "no"}, {"technicalImpact": "total"}], "role": "CISA Coordinator", "timestamp": "2026-07-31T00:00:00+00:00", "version": "2.0.3"}}]}, "published": "2026-07-31T16:16:59.480", "references": [{"source": "f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007", "tags": ["Patch"], "url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/64a9cdbd6a240a962144f84418beaf9e66419779"}, {"source": "f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007", "tags": ["Patch"], "url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/a7e74a6ed685bc34e1f77a8b6a94d00fa3dff815"}, {"source": "f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007", "tags": ["Issue Tracking", "Patch", "Vendor Advisory"], "url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10200"}], "sourceIdentifier": "f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007", "vulnStatus": "Analyzed", "weaknesses": [{"description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-522"}, {"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-639"}], "source": "f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007", "type": "Secondary"}]}

{"bugzilla": {"description": "pgadmin4: pgAdmin 4: Unauthorized database credential access via adhoc server cloning", "id": "2509833", "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2509833"}, "csaw": false, "cvss3": {"cvss3_base_score": "9.6", "cvss3_scoring_vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N", "status": "draft"}, "cwe": "CWE-639", "details": ["/misc/workspace/adhoc_connect_server, part of the Workspaces feature introduced in pgAdmin 4 9.0, when passed the id of an existing server, clones that server via Server.clone(), which copies every column from the source row, including user_id, shared, shared_username, and the stored credential fields password, save_password, and tunnel_password. When a non-owner triggered an adhoc connect against another user's (in practice, typically an administrator's) shared server, the clone inherited that user's ownership, shared flag, and stored database credentials verbatim. pgAdmin persisted this cross-tenant, credential-bearing server row before the connection was even attempted, so it survived even when the connection subsequently failed. The non-owner could then open the newly-owned clone and pgAdmin would connect using the source user's stored database password on the non-owner's behalf, granting the non-owner use of database credentials -- and whatever database privileges they confer -- that were never their own.\nFix forces the cloned adhoc record's ownership fields (user_id, shared, shared_username) and stored credential fields (password, save_password, tunnel_password) to belong to the calling user and be cleared/private before committing, regardless of the source server's ownership, sharing state, or stored credentials. A regression test asserts that an adhoc connect triggered by a non-owner against another user's shared server persists a row owned by the caller, not shared, and without the source's stored credentials.\nThis issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 9.0 before 9.17.", "A flaw was found in pgAdmin 4. An authenticated, low-privilege user could exploit a vulnerability in the adhoc server cloning feature to gain unauthorized access to another user's stored database credentials. By initiating an adhoc connection to a shared server owned by another user, the cloning process would inadvertently copy the owner's database password and associated privileges. This allows the attacker to connect to databases with the privileges of the original owner, leading to significant information disclosure and potential data manipulation."], "name": "CVE-2026-17349", "public_date": "2026-07-31T15:59:47Z", "references": ["https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-17349\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-17349\nhttps://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/64a9cdbd6a240a962144f84418beaf9e66419779\nhttps://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/a7e74a6ed685bc34e1f77a8b6a94d00fa3dff815\nhttps://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10200"], "statement": "This flaw only affects the Fedora community project and does not affect Red Hat products.", "threat_severity": "Critical"}

{"affected": [{"configurations": [{"platform": null, "status": "affected", "versions": {"scheme": "generic", "value": "[9.0,9.17)"}}], "enrichment": {"confidence": 89.0, "confidence_source": "matching", "scores": [{"score": 89.0, "source": "matching"}]}, "original": {"product": "pgAdmin 4", "source": "cna", "vendor": "pgadmin.org"}, "product": "pgadmin_4", "vendor": "pgadmin"}], "created": "2026-08-02T04:15:04.185390+00:00", "updated": "2026-08-02T19:15:17.025320+00:00", "vendors": ["pgadmin", "pgadmin$PRODUCT$pgadmin_4"]}