CVE-2026-16001

IesEngine stream-mode MAC forgery via length-dependent KDF split

Published Oct 2, 2026 CVSS 4.0 · 8.2 High EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
Exposure of the message authentication key through the encryption keystream in the stream mode of IesEngine (an IesEngine constructed without a block cipher) in Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. bc-csharp before 2.7.0 allows a remote attacker who has observed one encrypted message with known plaintext to forge shorter messages of their choosing that the recipient accepts as authentic, via a crafted ciphertext and MAC tag, because the MAC key was taken from the key derivation output directly after a keystream as long as the message, while the derivation input depends only on the static key pair and fixed parameters. The keystream revealed by that one message therefore contains the MAC key for every sufficiently shorter message.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record

Tracking

Sign in to view the affected projects.

Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Bouncycastle
Bouncycastle bc-csharp
CPEs cpe:2.3:a:bouncycastle:bc-csharp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Bouncycastle
Bouncycastle bc-csharp
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 7.5, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Legion Of The Bouncy Castle Inc.
Legion Of The Bouncy Castle Inc. bc-csharp
Vendors & Products Legion Of The Bouncy Castle Inc.
Legion Of The Bouncy Castle Inc. bc-csharp
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Exposure of the message authentication key through the encryption keystream in the stream mode of IesEngine (an IesEngine constructed without a block cipher) in Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. bc-csharp before 2.7.0 allows a remote attacker who has observed one encrypted message with known plaintext to forge shorter messages of their choosing that the recipient accepts as authentic, via a crafted ciphertext and MAC tag, because the MAC key was taken from the key derivation output directly after a keystream as long as the message, while the derivation input depends only on the static key pair and fixed parameters. The keystream revealed by that one message therefore contains the MAC key for every sufficiently shorter message.
Title IesEngine stream-mode MAC forgery via length-dependent KDF split
Weaknesses CWE-354
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 8.2, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}

Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
bcorg
Published
Updated
Oct 2, 2026, 5:55 PM
Reserved
Jul 16, 2026, 11:53 PM
Status
Analyzed
Published
Oct 2, 2026, 7:16 AM
Modified
Oct 27, 2026, 4:31 PM