Use-after-free / double-free from unsynchronized concurrent access to the TLS client session cache in Zephyr sockets
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
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| zephyrproject | zephyr | unaffected |
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| Zephyrproject | Zephyr |
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No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.412% probability within 30 days)
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Zephyrproject
Zephyrproject zephyr |
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Zephyrproject
Zephyrproject zephyr |
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ssvc
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| Description | Zephyr's TLS socket layer in subsys/net/lib/sockets/sockets_tls.c keeps a single process-global array, client_cache, of cached client sessions that is shared by every TLS socket context. The functions that mutate and read it — tls_session_save(), tls_session_get(), tls_session_cache_reset(), and the settings restore handler — allocate, free, and dereference each entry's heap buffer (entry->session). Before the fix these accesses were serialized only by the per-socket context mutex ctx->lock (assigned per socket in ctx_set_lock()), which provides no mutual exclusion between different sockets touching the shared cache. Because CONFIG_NET_SOCKETS_TLS_MAX_CLIENT_SESSION_COUNT defaults to 1, any two concurrent client sockets contend for the same slot. A thread in tls_session_get() reading entry->session inside mbedtls_ssl_session_load() can run concurrently with another thread in tls_session_save() that selects the same entry for reuse and executes mbedtls_free(entry->session) before reallocating — a use-after-free read, and a double-free when two saves evict the same entry. Both corrupt the mbedTLS heap. The cache is reached on ordinary client paths: at connect time via tls_session_store()/tls_session_restore(), and (on main) whenever a TLS 1.3 session ticket arrives during recv()/poll() via tls_session_store_current(). Exploitation requires an application that opts into per-socket client session caching (the TLS_SESSION_CACHE socket option, off by default) and runs concurrent TLS client connections on multiple threads; the timing that opens the window is influenced by the remote peer(s), so a malicious or compromised server can raise session-ticket frequency to widen it. The reliably-demonstrable impact is memory corruption leading to a crash or heap corruption (denial of service). The fix adds a dedicated session_cache_lock mutex taken across every accessor of client_cache, serializing all reads and frees and closing the race. | |
| Title | Use-after-free / double-free from unsynchronized concurrent access to the TLS client session cache in Zephyr sockets | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-416 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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