CVE-2026-14535

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Because the MLAllowlist check is silently skipped due to shared state pollution from UnsafeImportsML, fickling's check_safety() returns LIKELY_SAFE. When used with fickling.load(), the payload is deserialized and arbitrary code executes in the victim's environment. This is distinct from denylist incompleteness (CWE-184) because the allowlist mechanism was specifically designed to catch imports that the denylist misses, and a code defect renders it entirely inoperative."}]}], "affected": [{"vendor": "trailofbits", "product": "fickling", "collectionURL": "https://pypi.org/project/fickling/", "packageName": "fickling", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "0", "lessThanOrEqual": "0.1.11", "versionType": "custom"}, {"status": "unaffected", "version": "0.1.12", "versionType": "custom"}], "defaultStatus": "unaffected"}], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "In Trail of Bits fickling versions up to and including 0.1.11, the UnsafeImportsML analysis pass unconditionally calls AnalysisContext.shorten_code(node) on every import node it inspects, regardless of whether the import is flagged as unsafe. This call registers the shortened code representation in the shared AnalysisContext.reported_shortened_code set. When the MLAllowlist analysis pass subsequently runs, it calls the same shorten_code() method, receives already_reported=True for every import, and executes a continue statement that skips its allowlist check entirely. This renders MLAllowlist dead code for all imports \u2014 it never evaluates whether an import is in the ML allowlist or not. The MLAllowlist pass was designed to catch imports of modules outside the known-safe ML ecosystem (torch, numpy, transformers, etc.) that slip past the UnsafeImports denylist. With MLAllowlist inoperative, any standard library module not in the UNSAFE_IMPORTS denylist can be invoked via pickle deserialization while fickling's check_safety() returns LIKELY_SAFE. The fickling.load() API chains check_safety() into pickle.loads() as an explicit security gate, meaning a LIKELY_SAFE verdict causes the payload to be deserialized and executed. The root cause is shared mutable state between independently-correct analysis passes \u2014 UnsafeImportsML works as designed in isolation, MLAllowlist works as designed in isolation, but the shared reported_shortened_code set causes UnsafeImportsML to poison MLAllowlist's deduplication logic.", "supportingMedia": [{"type": "text/html", "base64": false, "value": "<p>In Trail of Bits fickling versions up to and including 0.1.11, the UnsafeImportsML analysis pass unconditionally calls AnalysisContext.shorten_code(node) on every import node it inspects, regardless of whether the import is flagged as unsafe. This call registers the shortened code representation in the shared AnalysisContext.reported_shortened_code set. When the MLAllowlist analysis pass subsequently runs, it calls the same shorten_code() method, receives already_reported=True for every import, and executes a continue statement that skips its allowlist check entirely. This renders MLAllowlist dead code for all imports \u2014 it never evaluates whether an import is in the ML allowlist or not. The MLAllowlist pass was designed to catch imports of modules outside the known-safe ML ecosystem (torch, numpy, transformers, etc.) that slip past the UnsafeImports denylist. With MLAllowlist inoperative, any standard library module not in the UNSAFE_IMPORTS denylist can be invoked via pickle deserialization while fickling's check_safety() returns LIKELY_SAFE. The fickling.load() API chains check_safety() into pickle.loads() as an explicit security gate, meaning a LIKELY_SAFE verdict causes the payload to be deserialized and executed. The root cause is shared mutable state between independently-correct analysis passes \u2014 UnsafeImportsML works as designed in isolation, MLAllowlist works as designed in isolation, but the shared reported_shortened_code set causes UnsafeImportsML to poison MLAllowlist's deduplication logic.</p>"}]}], "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/security/advisories/GHSA-cffv-grgg-g429", "name": "GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-cffv-grgg-g429"}, {"url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/pull/278", "name": "Fix PR #278 \u2014 Split shorten_code() formatting from dedup tracking, make MLAllowlist opt-in"}, {"url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/41ce7cb01edd97072994039574a2301ebb3f463d", "name": "Fix commit 41ce7cb (squash merge of PR #278)"}, {"url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/releases/tag/v0.1.12", "name": "Fickling v0.1.12 release"}], "metrics": [{"format": "CVSS", "scenarios": [{"lang": "en", "value": "GENERAL"}], "cvssV3_1": {"version": "3.1", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H"}}], "credits": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Christopher Aziz (Bombadil Systems LLC)", "type": "finder"}], "source": {"discovery": "EXTERNAL"}, "x_generator": {"engine": "Vulnogram 1.0.2"}}, "adp": [{"references": [{"url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/security/advisories/GHSA-cffv-grgg-g429", "tags": ["exploit"]}], "metrics": [{"other": {"type": "ssvc", "content": {"timestamp": "2026-07-06T14:58:30.612222Z", "id": "CVE-2026-14535", "options": [{"Exploitation": "poc"}, {"Automatable": "no"}, {"Technical Impact": "total"}], "role": "CISA Coordinator", "version": "2.0.3"}}}], "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment", "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "shortName": "CISA-ADP", "dateUpdated": "2026-07-06T14:58:34.718Z"}}]}}

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This call registers the shortened code representation in the shared AnalysisContext.reported_shortened_code set. When the MLAllowlist analysis pass subsequently runs, it calls the same shorten_code() method, receives already_reported=True for every import, and executes a continue statement that skips its allowlist check entirely. This renders MLAllowlist dead code for all imports \u2014 it never evaluates whether an import is in the ML allowlist or not. The MLAllowlist pass was designed to catch imports of modules outside the known-safe ML ecosystem (torch, numpy, transformers, etc.) that slip past the UnsafeImports denylist. With MLAllowlist inoperative, any standard library module not in the UNSAFE_IMPORTS denylist can be invoked via pickle deserialization while fickling's check_safety() returns LIKELY_SAFE. The fickling.load() API chains check_safety() into pickle.loads() as an explicit security gate, meaning a LIKELY_SAFE verdict causes the payload to be deserialized and executed. 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This renders MLAllowlist dead code for all imports \u2014 it never evaluates whether an import is in the ML allowlist or not. The MLAllowlist pass was designed to catch imports of modules outside the known-safe ML ecosystem (torch, numpy, transformers, etc.) that slip past the UnsafeImports denylist. With MLAllowlist inoperative, any standard library module not in the UNSAFE_IMPORTS denylist can be invoked via pickle deserialization while fickling's check_safety() returns LIKELY_SAFE. The fickling.load() API chains check_safety() into pickle.loads() as an explicit security gate, meaning a LIKELY_SAFE verdict causes the payload to be deserialized and executed. The root cause is shared mutable state between independently-correct analysis passes \u2014 UnsafeImportsML works as designed in isolation, MLAllowlist works as designed in isolation, but the shared reported_shortened_code set causes UnsafeImportsML to poison MLAllowlist's deduplication logic.</p>", "base64": false}]}], "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "type": "CWE", "cweId": "CWE-693", "description": "CWE-693 Protection Mechanism Failure"}]}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "aa17e1a1-c329-4d6e-a1ed-8d0188aea082", "shortName": "BombadilSystems", "dateUpdated": "2026-07-04T13:31:14.937Z"}}}, "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-14535", "state": "PUBLISHED", "dateUpdated": "2026-07-06T14:58:34.718Z", "dateReserved": "2026-07-03T00:02:55.918Z", "assignerOrgId": "aa17e1a1-c329-4d6e-a1ed-8d0188aea082", "datePublished": "2026-07-04T13:31:14.937Z", "assignerShortName": "BombadilSystems"}, "dataVersion": "5.2"}

{"affected": [{"affectedData": [{"collectionURL": "https://pypi.org/project/fickling/", "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "packageName": "fickling", "product": "fickling", "vendor": "trailofbits", "versions": [{"lessThanOrEqual": "0.1.11", "status": "affected", "version": "0", "versionType": "custom"}, {"status": "unaffected", "version": "0.1.12", "versionType": "custom"}]}], "source": "aa17e1a1-c329-4d6e-a1ed-8d0188aea082"}], "configurations": [{"nodes": [{"cpeMatch": [{"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:trailofbits:fickling:*:*:*:*:*:python:*:*", "matchCriteriaId": "A3AF23ED-3F44-48AF-A1AC-CFCDC22A55D3", "versionEndIncluding": "0.1.11", "vulnerable": true}], "negate": false, "operator": "OR"}]}], "cveTags": [], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "In Trail of Bits fickling versions up to and including 0.1.11, the UnsafeImportsML analysis pass unconditionally calls AnalysisContext.shorten_code(node) on every import node it inspects, regardless of whether the import is flagged as unsafe. This call registers the shortened code representation in the shared AnalysisContext.reported_shortened_code set. When the MLAllowlist analysis pass subsequently runs, it calls the same shorten_code() method, receives already_reported=True for every import, and executes a continue statement that skips its allowlist check entirely. This renders MLAllowlist dead code for all imports \u2014 it never evaluates whether an import is in the ML allowlist or not. The MLAllowlist pass was designed to catch imports of modules outside the known-safe ML ecosystem (torch, numpy, transformers, etc.) that slip past the UnsafeImports denylist. With MLAllowlist inoperative, any standard library module not in the UNSAFE_IMPORTS denylist can be invoked via pickle deserialization while fickling's check_safety() returns LIKELY_SAFE. The fickling.load() API chains check_safety() into pickle.loads() as an explicit security gate, meaning a LIKELY_SAFE verdict causes the payload to be deserialized and executed. The root cause is shared mutable state between independently-correct analysis passes \u2014 UnsafeImportsML works as designed in isolation, MLAllowlist works as designed in isolation, but the shared reported_shortened_code set causes UnsafeImportsML to poison MLAllowlist's deduplication logic."}, {"lang": "es", "value": "En las versiones de fickling de Trail of Bits hasta la 0.1.11 inclusive, la pasada de an\u00e1lisis UnsafeImportsML llama incondicionalmente a AnalysisContext.shorten_code(node) en cada nodo de importaci\u00f3n que inspecciona, independientemente de si la importaci\u00f3n est\u00e1 marcada como insegura. Esta llamada registra la representaci\u00f3n de c\u00f3digo acortada en el conjunto compartido AnalysisContext.reported_shortened_code. Cuando la pasada de an\u00e1lisis MLAllowlist se ejecuta posteriormente, llama al mismo m\u00e9todo shorten_code(), recibe already_reported=True para cada importaci\u00f3n y ejecuta una sentencia continue que omite completamente su verificaci\u00f3n de lista de permitidos. Esto convierte a MLAllowlist en c\u00f3digo muerto para todas las importaciones - nunca eval\u00faa si una importaci\u00f3n est\u00e1 en la lista de permitidos de ML o no. La pasada MLAllowlist fue dise\u00f1ada para detectar importaciones de m\u00f3dulos fuera del ecosistema de ML conocido como seguro (torch, numpy, transformers, etc.) que escapan a la lista de denegados de UnsafeImports. Con MLAllowlist inoperativa, cualquier m\u00f3dulo de la biblioteca est\u00e1ndar que no est\u00e9 en la lista de denegados UNSAFE_IMPORTS puede ser invocado a trav\u00e9s de la deserializaci\u00f3n de pickle mientras que check_safety() de fickling devuelve LIKELY_SAFE. La API fickling.load() encadena check_safety() en pickle.loads() como una puerta de seguridad expl\u00edcita, lo que significa que un veredicto LIKELY_SAFE hace que la carga \u00fatil sea deserializada y ejecutada. La causa ra\u00edz es el estado mutable compartido entre pasadas de an\u00e1lisis independientemente correctas - UnsafeImportsML funciona seg\u00fan lo dise\u00f1ado de forma aislada, MLAllowlist funciona seg\u00fan lo dise\u00f1ado de forma aislada, pero el conjunto compartido reported_shortened_code hace que UnsafeImportsML envenene la l\u00f3gica de deduplicaci\u00f3n de MLAllowlist."}], "id": "CVE-2026-14535", "lastModified": "2026-10-25T15:10:00.147", "metrics": {"cvssMetricV31": [{"cvssData": {"attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.8, "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1"}, "exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "impactScore": 5.9, "source": "aa17e1a1-c329-4d6e-a1ed-8d0188aea082", "type": "Secondary"}, {"cvssData": {"attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1"}, "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "impactScore": 5.9, "source": "nvd@nist.gov", "type": "Primary"}], "ssvcV203": [{"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "ssvcData": {"id": "CVE-2026-14535", "options": [{"exploitation": "poc"}, {"automatable": "no"}, {"technicalImpact": "total"}], "role": "CISA Coordinator", "timestamp": "2026-07-06T14:58:30.612222Z", "version": "2.0.3"}}]}, "published": "2026-07-04T14:16:29.063", "references": [{"source": "aa17e1a1-c329-4d6e-a1ed-8d0188aea082", "tags": ["Patch"], "url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/41ce7cb01edd97072994039574a2301ebb3f463d"}, {"source": "aa17e1a1-c329-4d6e-a1ed-8d0188aea082", "tags": ["Issue Tracking", "Patch"], "url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/pull/278"}, {"source": "aa17e1a1-c329-4d6e-a1ed-8d0188aea082", "tags": ["Release Notes"], "url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/releases/tag/v0.1.12"}, {"source": "aa17e1a1-c329-4d6e-a1ed-8d0188aea082", "tags": ["Exploit", "Third Party Advisory"], "url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/security/advisories/GHSA-cffv-grgg-g429"}, {"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "tags": ["Exploit", "Third Party Advisory"], "url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/security/advisories/GHSA-cffv-grgg-g429"}], "sourceIdentifier": "aa17e1a1-c329-4d6e-a1ed-8d0188aea082", "vulnStatus": "Analyzed", "weaknesses": [{"description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-693"}], "source": "aa17e1a1-c329-4d6e-a1ed-8d0188aea082", "type": "Secondary"}]}

{"bugzilla": {"description": "fickling: Fickling: Arbitrary code execution via pickle deserialization bypass", "id": "2497049", "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2497049"}, "csaw": false, "cvss3": {"cvss3_base_score": "8.8", "cvss3_scoring_vector": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "status": "draft"}, "cwe": "CWE-693", "details": ["In Trail of Bits fickling versions up to and including 0.1.11, the UnsafeImportsML analysis pass unconditionally calls AnalysisContext.shorten_code(node) on every import node it inspects, regardless of whether the import is flagged as unsafe. This call registers the shortened code representation in the shared AnalysisContext.reported_shortened_code set. When the MLAllowlist analysis pass subsequently runs, it calls the same shorten_code() method, receives already_reported=True for every import, and executes a continue statement that skips its allowlist check entirely. This renders MLAllowlist dead code for all imports \u2014 it never evaluates whether an import is in the ML allowlist or not. The MLAllowlist pass was designed to catch imports of modules outside the known-safe ML ecosystem (torch, numpy, transformers, etc.) that slip past the UnsafeImports denylist. With MLAllowlist inoperative, any standard library module not in the UNSAFE_IMPORTS denylist can be invoked via pickle deserialization while fickling's check_safety() returns LIKELY_SAFE. The fickling.load() API chains check_safety() into pickle.loads() as an explicit security gate, meaning a LIKELY_SAFE verdict causes the payload to be deserialized and executed. The root cause is shared mutable state between independently-correct analysis passes \u2014 UnsafeImportsML works as designed in isolation, MLAllowlist works as designed in isolation, but the shared reported_shortened_code set causes UnsafeImportsML to poison MLAllowlist's deduplication logic.", "A flaw was found in the fickling library, versions up to and including 0.1.11. A logic error in the security analysis passes allows an attacker to bypass intended safety checks during `pickle` deserialization. This vulnerability enables the invocation of arbitrary standard library modules, leading to the execution of malicious code. The `fickling.load()` API, designed as a security gate, incorrectly reports payloads as safe, allowing them to be deserialized and executed."], "mitigation": {"lang": "en:us", "value": "Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base or stability."}, "name": "CVE-2026-14535", "package_state": [{"cpe": "cpe:/a:redhat:exploit_intelligence:0", "fix_state": "Affected", "package_name": "exploit-intelligence-tech-preview/vulnerability-analysis-rhel9", "product_name": "Exploit Intelligence"}], "public_date": "2026-07-04T13:31:14Z", "references": ["https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-14535\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-14535\nhttps://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/41ce7cb01edd97072994039574a2301ebb3f463d\nhttps://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/pull/278\nhttps://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/releases/tag/v0.1.12\nhttps://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/security/advisories/GHSA-cffv-grgg-g429"], "statement": "A flaw was found in Trail of Bits fickling versions through 0.1.11, where a logic error in the security analysis pipeline silently disables the MLAllowlist safety check. The UnsafeImportsML pass inadvertently populates the shared reported_shortened_code set for all imports, causing the MLAllowlist pass to skip its allowlist evaluation entirely. This allows standard library modules outside the denylist to pass check_safety() as LIKELY_SAFE, enabling arbitrary code execution when fickling.load() proceeds with deserialization. The upstream advisory rates this as Moderate severity; Red Hat's assessment reflects the arbitrary code execution impact in the CVSS score.", "threat_severity": "Important"}

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