Easy Appointments < 3.12.28 - Subscriber+ Cross-User Appointment Data Modification via IDOR
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unknown | Easy Appointments | unaffected |
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No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Easy-appointments | Easy Appointments |
|
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| Wordpress | Wordpress |
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No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.230% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | The Easy Appointments WordPress plugin through 3.12.26 does not verify that the appointment targeted by its customer-data update action belongs to the current user; the action only checks a shared nonce that any authenticated user can obtain from their own appointment's edit form. A subscriber-level user with an appointment of their own can therefore reuse that nonce to overwrite the customer metadata (email, name, phone, description) of another user's appointment. Because the Easy Appointments WordPress plugin through 3.12.26 then treats that metadata as the appointment's contact data, a subsequent administrator status change with customer notifications enabled delivers the victim's appointment notification to the attacker-controlled email address. | The Easy Appointments WordPress plugin before 3.12.28 does not verify that the appointment targeted by its customer-data update action belongs to the current user; the action only checks a shared nonce that any authenticated user can obtain from their own appointment's edit form. A subscriber-level user with an appointment of their own can therefore reuse that nonce to overwrite the customer metadata (email, name, phone, description) of another user's appointment. Because the Easy Appointments WordPress plugin before 3.12.28 then treats that metadata as the appointment's contact data, a subsequent administrator status change with customer notifications enabled delivers the victim's appointment notification to the attacker-controlled email address. |
| Title | Easy Appointments <= 3.12.26 - Subscriber+ Cross-User Appointment Data Modification via IDOR | Easy Appointments < 3.12.28 - Subscriber+ Cross-User Appointment Data Modification via IDOR |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-639 | |
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Easy-appointments
Easy-appointments easy Appointments Wordpress Wordpress wordpress |
|
| Vendors & Products |
Easy-appointments
Easy-appointments easy Appointments Wordpress Wordpress wordpress |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | The Easy Appointments WordPress plugin through 3.12.26 does not verify that the appointment targeted by its customer-data update action belongs to the current user; the action only checks a shared nonce that any authenticated user can obtain from their own appointment's edit form. A subscriber-level user with an appointment of their own can therefore reuse that nonce to overwrite the customer metadata (email, name, phone, description) of another user's appointment. Because the Easy Appointments WordPress plugin through 3.12.26 then treats that metadata as the appointment's contact data, a subsequent administrator status change with customer notifications enabled delivers the victim's appointment notification to the attacker-controlled email address. | |
| Title | Easy Appointments <= 3.12.26 - Subscriber+ Cross-User Appointment Data Modification via IDOR | |
| References |
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