Loofah: CSS url() sanitization bypass via escaped parentheses
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| flavorjones | loofah | affected |
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| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flavorjones | Loofah |
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| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
Github GHSA |
GHSA-m3x9-938q-5767 | Loofah: CSS url() sanitization bypass via escaped parentheses |
No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.287% probability within 30 days)
Key SSVC decision points have not yet been added.
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Flavorjones
Flavorjones loofah |
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| Vendors & Products |
Flavorjones
Flavorjones loofah |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Loofah is a general library for manipulating and transforming HTML/XML documents and fragments, built on top of Nokogiri. Prior to 2.25.3, Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.scrub_css checks only the first parse of a style attribute, then rebuilds CSS with identifier escapes decoded so escaped parentheses, property names, comments, or quotes can become a live url() without a second safety check. An attacker can use list-style to make a viewer's browser request an attacker-chosen URL when content renders, or cursor to make the request on hover. The request can disclose the viewer's IP address, user agent, access timing, and access to internal-network hosts, but no script survives sanitization and the attacker cannot read the response. This issue is fixed in version 2.25.3. | |
| Title | Loofah: CSS url() sanitization bypass via escaped parentheses | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-180 CWE-184 |
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| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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