CVE-2026-123867

Node.js is vulnerable to a per-host mTLS authorization bypass via a CA-only SNI context failing open to the default CA

Published Nov 11, 2026 CVSS 3.1 · 4.2 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
A per-host mutual-TLS authorization bypass in Node.js lets a client authorized for the default hostname reach a protected hostname it is not authorized for. When a TLS server assigns a hostname a different client-certificate CA with `server.addContext(host, { ca: protectedCA })` but no server certificate in that SNI context, the per-host client CA is never installed and the handshake falls back to the default client CA. In `src/crypto/crypto_tls.cc`, `CertCbDone` installs the SNI context's CA only when `setSniContext` succeeds, but `setSniContext` returns `false` for a context with no server certificate, so a CA-only SNI context silently keeps the default CA. A client holding a certificate trusted by the default CA, but not the protected CA, can therefore complete mTLS to the protected hostname and read its response even with `requestCert` and `rejectUnauthorized` enabled, while a client certified by the protected CA is rejected. This vulnerability affects Node.js 26.x, 24.x, and 22.x.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Nodejs
Nodejs nodejs
Vendors & Products Nodejs
Nodejs nodejs
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics cvssV3_0

{'score': 4.2, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description A per-host mutual-TLS authorization bypass in Node.js lets a client authorized for the default hostname reach a protected hostname it is not authorized for. When a TLS server assigns a hostname a different client-certificate CA with server.addContext(host, { ca: protectedCA }) but no server certificate in that SNI context, the per-host client CA is never installed and the handshake falls back to the default client CA. In src/crypto/crypto_tls.cc, CertCbDone installs the SNI context's CA only when setSniContext succeeds, but setSniContext returns false for a context with no server certificate, so a CA-only SNI context silently keeps the default CA. A client holding a certificate trusted by the default CA, but not the protected CA, can therefore complete mTLS to the protected hostname and read its response even with requestCert and rejectUnauthorized enabled, while a client certified by the protected CA is rejected. This vulnerability affects Node.js 26.x, 24.x, and 22.x. A per-host mutual-TLS authorization bypass in Node.js lets a client authorized for the default hostname reach a protected hostname it is not authorized for. When a TLS server assigns a hostname a different client-certificate CA with `server.addContext(host, { ca: protectedCA })` but no server certificate in that SNI context, the per-host client CA is never installed and the handshake falls back to the default client CA. In `src/crypto/crypto_tls.cc`, `CertCbDone` installs the SNI context's CA only when `setSniContext` succeeds, but `setSniContext` returns `false` for a context with no server certificate, so a CA-only SNI context silently keeps the default CA. A client holding a certificate trusted by the default CA, but not the protected CA, can therefore complete mTLS to the protected hostname and read its response even with `requestCert` and `rejectUnauthorized` enabled, while a client certified by the protected CA is rejected. This vulnerability affects Node.js 26.x, 24.x, and 22.x.
Type Values Removed Values Added
References
Metrics threat_severity

None

cvssV3_1

{'score': 4.2, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N'}

threat_severity

Moderate

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description A per-host mutual-TLS authorization bypass in Node.js lets a client authorized for the default hostname reach a protected hostname it is not authorized for. When a TLS server assigns a hostname a different client-certificate CA with server.addContext(host, { ca: protectedCA }) but no server certificate in that SNI context, the per-host client CA is never installed and the handshake falls back to the default client CA. In src/crypto/crypto_tls.cc, CertCbDone installs the SNI context's CA only when setSniContext succeeds, but setSniContext returns false for a context with no server certificate, so a CA-only SNI context silently keeps the default CA. A client holding a certificate trusted by the default CA, but not the protected CA, can therefore complete mTLS to the protected hostname and read its response even with requestCert and rejectUnauthorized enabled, while a client certified by the protected CA is rejected. This vulnerability affects Node.js 26.x, 24.x, and 22.x.
Title Node.js is vulnerable to a per-host mTLS authorization bypass via a CA-only SNI context failing open to the default CA
Weaknesses CWE-295
References
Metrics cvssV3_0

{'score': 4.2, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N'}

Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
openjs
Published
Updated
Nov 12, 2026, 2:34 PM
Reserved
Nov 6, 2026, 4:16 PM
Status
Awaiting Analysis
Published
Nov 11, 2026, 7:17 PM
Modified
Nov 12, 2026, 7:02 PM
Severity
Moderate
Public date
Nov 11, 2026, 6:23 PM