CVE-2026-120306

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Worker pods are privileged. Clip v2 layered builds are the default, so a tenant with a workspace token reaches this by submitting one image build. The read-only proof confirmed the shared namespaces, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, and that the worker's runc binary is visible at /proc/1/root. Fixed in worker 0.1.756: Buildah RUN steps, including the WORKDIR mkdir, use OCI isolation with private PID, IPC, and network namespaces, and tenant ARG values are passed only into the build container.</p>"}]}], "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/beam-cloud/beta9", "name": "Beta9 repository", "tags": ["product"]}, {"url": "https://github.com/beam-cloud/beta9/pull/1897", "name": "Handle sandbox edge cases (fix pull request)", "tags": ["patch"]}, {"url": "https://github.com/beam-cloud/beta9/commit/a28bf12cf0007c792a25d8ed282b4e8bf6f30393", "name": "Fix commit a28bf12", "tags": ["patch"]}, {"url": "https://github.com/beam-cloud/beta9/releases/tag/worker-0.1.756", "name": "worker-0.1.756", "tags": ["release-notes"]}], "metrics": [{"format": "CVSS", "scenarios": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Default clip v2 layered image build on a privileged build-pool worker"}], "cvssV3_1": {"version": "3.1", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "userInteraction": "NONE", "scope": "CHANGED", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "baseScore": 9.9, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"}}], "solutions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Upgrade the Beta9 worker to 0.1.756 or later. 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