CVE-2026-119776

frr: ospf6d fails to enforce all OSPFv3 packets use IPv6 link-local addresses

Published Nov 4, 2026 CVSS 4.0 · 6.1 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
In all prior released versions of FRRouting, the OSPFv3 (for IPv6) implementation does not check that OSPFv3 packets have a link-local source address and either a link-local destination or one of the protocol multicast destination groups. This may enable malicious actors to establish OSPFv3 adjacencies from unexpectedly, distant IPv6 hosts. Proper usage of OSPFv3 authentication trailers (RFC 7166, as is best practice) prevents full exploitation of this issue, though may allow a malicious actor to waste CPU on authentication checks.


Note the linked PR #23935 is not sufficient to fix the issue as it only verifies the source address. It is the destination address that must be checked.


Required configuration: The OSPFv3 for IPv6 routing protocol must be running (ospf6d process) and in use (enabled globally with "router ospf6" and on specific interfaces with "ipv6 ospf6 area".)


Workaround: either:

* configure OSPFv3 authentication trailers ("ipv6 ospf6 authentication")
* or ensure through firewall configuration that only packets with link-local or multicast destination addresses are accepted on input for IPv6 protocol 89 (OSPF). Note that checking the source address is insufficient, as some routers may (unexpectedly) forward packets with global-scoped IPv6 destination addresses even if they have link-local source addresses.

Remediation

Vendor Workaround

Either: * configure OSPFv3 authentication trailers ("ipv6 ospf6 authentication") * or ensure through firewall configuration that only packets with link-local or multicast destination addresses are accepted on input for IPv6 protocol 89 (OSPF). Note that checking the source address is insufficient, as some routers may (unexpectedly) forward packets with global-scoped IPv6 destination addresses even if they have link-local source addresses.

Tracking

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Advisories

No advisories available
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'total'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-940
References
Metrics threat_severity

None

cvssV3_1

{'score': 7.7, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H'}

threat_severity

Important

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In all prior released versions of FRRouting, the OSPFv3 (for IPv6) implementation does not check that OSPFv3 packets have a link-local source address and either a link-local destination or one of the protocol multicast destination groups. This may enable malicious actors to establish OSPFv3 adjacencies from unexpectedly, distant IPv6 hosts. Proper usage of OSPFv3 authentication trailers (RFC 7166, as is best practice) prevents full exploitation of this issue, though may allow a malicious actor to waste CPU on authentication checks. Note the linked PR #23935 is not sufficient to fix the issue as it only verifies the source address. It is the destination address that must be checked. In all prior released versions of FRRouting, the OSPFv3 (for IPv6) implementation does not check that OSPFv3 packets have a link-local source address and either a link-local destination or one of the protocol multicast destination groups. This may enable malicious actors to establish OSPFv3 adjacencies from unexpectedly, distant IPv6 hosts. Proper usage of OSPFv3 authentication trailers (RFC 7166, as is best practice) prevents full exploitation of this issue, though may allow a malicious actor to waste CPU on authentication checks. Note the linked PR #23935 is not sufficient to fix the issue as it only verifies the source address. It is the destination address that must be checked. Required configuration: The OSPFv3 for IPv6 routing protocol must be running (ospf6d process) and in use (enabled globally with "router ospf6" and on specific interfaces with "ipv6 ospf6 area".) Workaround: either: * configure OSPFv3 authentication trailers ("ipv6 ospf6 authentication") * or ensure through firewall configuration that only packets with link-local or multicast destination addresses are accepted on input for IPv6 protocol 89 (OSPF). Note that checking the source address is insufficient, as some routers may (unexpectedly) forward packets with global-scoped IPv6 destination addresses even if they have link-local source addresses.
Title FRRouting OSPFv3 Address Validation Vulnerability frr: ospf6d fails to enforce all OSPFv3 packets use IPv6 link-local addresses
Type Values Removed Values Added
Title FRRouting OSPFv3 Address Validation Vulnerability
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In all prior released versions of FRRouting, the OSPFv3 (for IPv6) implementation does not check that OSPFv3 packets have a link-local source address and either a link-local destination or one of the protocol multicast destination groups. This may enable malicious actors to establish OSPFv3 adjacencies from unexpectedly, distant IPv6 hosts. Proper usage of OSPFv3 authentication trailers (RFC 7166, as is best practice) prevents full exploitation of this issue, though may allow a malicious actor to waste CPU on authentication checks. Note the linked PR #23935 is not sufficient to fix the issue as it only verifies the source address. It is the destination address that must be checked.
First Time appeared Frrouting
Frrouting frrouting
Weaknesses CWE-304
CPEs cpe:2.3:a:frrouting:frrouting:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Frrouting
Frrouting frrouting
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 6.1, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/AU:Y'}

Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
NetDEF
Published
Updated
Nov 9, 2026, 9:11 PM
Reserved
Oct 30, 2026, 4:14 PM
Status
Deferred
Published
Nov 4, 2026, 3:17 PM
Modified
Nov 12, 2026, 10:11 PM
Severity
Important
Public date
Nov 4, 2026, 2:15 PM