Missing Authorization in get_deployed_stack Endpoint in zenml-io/zenml
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| zenml-io | zenml-io/zenml | affected |
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No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Zenml-io | Zenml-io/zenml |
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No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.1
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.230% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Zenml-io
Zenml-io zenml-io/zenml |
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| Vendors & Products |
Zenml-io
Zenml-io zenml-io/zenml |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In zenml-io/zenml version 0.94.2, the `GET /api/v1/stack-deployment/stack` endpoint (`get_deployed_stack`) lacks proper RBAC authorization checks, allowing any authenticated user to enumerate all deployed stacks across all users and tenants. This includes stack component details, service connector information, and user IDs of stack owners. The vulnerability arises from two issues: missing endpoint-level RBAC checks and the use of a server-side `Client()` that bypasses the RBAC enforcement layer by directly accessing the database through `SqlZenStore`. This exposes sensitive information such as infrastructure topology, service connector details, stack ownership, and deployment metadata, potentially enabling cross-tenant reconnaissance and further attacks in multi-tenant ZenML Pro/Cloud deployments. | |
| Title | Missing Authorization in get_deployed_stack Endpoint in zenml-io/zenml | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-862 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_0
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