epiphany: TAR-based .xpi with hard links can overwrite user files during WebExtension install
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
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| GNOME | Epiphany | unaffected |
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| Gnome | Epiphany |
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Vendor Workaround
Do not install WebExtensions (.xpi) from untrusted sources. Prefer keeping WebExtensions disabled when unused (Epiphany can refuse install when the feature is disabled in recent fixes). After any untrusted .xpi install attempt, inspect unexpectedly modified user files (for example shell startup files, autostart desktop entries, or SSH authorized_keys). Upgrade to a fixed Epiphany build containing MR !2248 / commit 0cc9ab55 when available for your stream.
No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.182% probability within 30 days)
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ssvc
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| Description | A file overwrite vulnerability exists in Epiphany when installing WebExtension packages from .xpi files. In src/webextension/ephy-web-extension-manager.c, decompress_xpi_thread() used libarchive with archive_read_support_format_all() (and filters), so the installer did not require a real ZIP. A TAR file named *.xpi was extracted. TAR supports hard-link entry types; with Epiphany's archive_write_disk options (including ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_PERM), a crafted hard-link target can cause an attacker-chosen existing user-writable file to be truncated and overwritten with attacker-controlled content and mode bits, without a dedicated warning dialog, when the user installs or opens the crafted .xpi. This is related to but separate from the ZIP-slip path traversal fixed as CVE-2026-77679 (#2922 / MR !2143). Requirements: the victim must install or open a malicious WebExtension (.xpi). Affected: Epiphany >= 47.0 (WebExtension XPI install path). Fixed: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/epiphany/-/merge_requests/2248 (commit 0cc9ab55 — only enable ZIP format support). Upstream: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/epiphany/-/work_items/2988 Reporter acknowledgment: Fernando Munoz | A file overwrite vulnerability exists in Epiphany when installing WebExtension packages from .xpi files. In src/webextension/ephy-web-extension-manager.c, decompress_xpi_thread() used libarchive with archive_read_support_format_all() (and filters), so the installer did not require a real ZIP. A TAR file named *.xpi was extracted. TAR supports hard-link entry types; with Epiphany's archive_write_disk options (including ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_PERM), a crafted hard-link target can cause an attacker-chosen existing user-writable file to be truncated and overwritten with attacker-controlled content and mode bits, without a dedicated warning dialog, when the user installs or opens the crafted .xpi. This is related to but separate from the ZIP-slip path traversal fixed as CVE-2026-77679 (#2922 / MR !2143). Requirements: the victim must install or open a malicious WebExtension (.xpi). Affected: Epiphany >= 47.0 (WebExtension XPI install path). Fixed: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/epiphany/-/merge_requests/2248 (commit 0cc9ab55 — only enable ZIP format support). Upstream: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/epiphany/-/work_items/2988 Reporter acknowledgment: Fernando Munoz |
| Title | epiphany: epiphany: TAR-based .xpi with hard links can overwrite user files during WebExtension install | epiphany: TAR-based .xpi with hard links can overwrite user files during WebExtension install |
| References |
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| First Time appeared |
Gnome
Gnome epiphany |
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| Vendors & Products |
Gnome
Gnome epiphany |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | A file overwrite vulnerability exists in Epiphany when installing WebExtension packages from .xpi files. In src/webextension/ephy-web-extension-manager.c, decompress_xpi_thread() used libarchive with archive_read_support_format_all() (and filters), so the installer did not require a real ZIP. A TAR file named *.xpi was extracted. TAR supports hard-link entry types; with Epiphany's archive_write_disk options (including ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_PERM), a crafted hard-link target can cause an attacker-chosen existing user-writable file to be truncated and overwritten with attacker-controlled content and mode bits, without a dedicated warning dialog, when the user installs or opens the crafted .xpi. This is related to but separate from the ZIP-slip path traversal fixed as CVE-2026-77679 (#2922 / MR !2143). Requirements: the victim must install or open a malicious WebExtension (.xpi). Affected: Epiphany >= 47.0 (WebExtension XPI install path). Fixed: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/epiphany/-/merge_requests/2248 (commit 0cc9ab55 — only enable ZIP format support). Upstream: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/epiphany/-/work_items/2988 Reporter acknowledgment: Fernando Munoz | |
| Title | epiphany: epiphany: TAR-based .xpi with hard links can overwrite user files during WebExtension install | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-59 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
threat_severity
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cvssV3_1
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