Community.general: community.general nexmo — api credentials exposed in get url query string[security] community.general nexmo — api credentials exposed in get url query string
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions |
|---|---|---|---|
| Red Hat | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10 | unknown | — |
| Red Hat | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 | unknown | — |
| Red Hat | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 | unknown | — |
| Red Hat | Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 | unknown | — |
Configuration 1 [-]
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| Redhat | Community.general |
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| Redhat | Enterprise Linux |
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Vendor Workaround
The following practices would help for avoiding exposure and mitigate this flaw: - If possible, stop using the community.general nexmo module entirely. It is deprecated upstream and was removed in community.general 9.0.0. Consider using the Vonage API directly via the community.general uri module with POST method and credentials in the request body. - Review web server, proxy, and load balancer access logs for any recorded Vonage API URLs containing api_key and api_secret parameters. Rotate any credentials found in logs. - Restrict access to HTTP access logs on systems where the nexmo module has been used. - Configure proxy and web server logging to redact or exclude query string parameters from URL logging where possible.
No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.394% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| CPEs | cpe:/o:redhat:enterprise_linux:8 cpe:/o:redhat:enterprise_linux:9 |
cpe:/a:redhat:enterprise_linux:10 cpe:/a:redhat:enterprise_linux:8 cpe:/a:redhat:enterprise_linux:9 |
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| Description | Module: plugins/modules/nexmo.py CVSS 3.1: 6.5 MEDIUM — AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N Issue: api_key and api_secret are declared no_log=True at the input level, but both credentials are immediately URL-encoded into a GET request as query parameters, bypassing all no_log protection. Vulnerable Code (lines 82-93): msg = { "api_key": module.params.get("api_key"), "api_secret": module.params.get("api_secret"), "from": module.params.get("src"), "text": module.params.get("msg"), } url = f"{NEXMO_API}?{urlencode(msg)}" response, info = fetch_url(module, url, headers=headers) Observed Output: https://rest.nexmo.com/sms/json?api_key=a1b2c3d4&api_secret=MyS3cr3tK3y!!&from=AnsibleBot&to=15551234567&text=Hello Exposure Vectors: Ansible verbose output (-vvv) logs the full request URL Vonage/Nexmo server access logs record credentials in query string HTTP proxies, SIEM, and network inspection tools capture the full URL AWX/Automation Controller network debug logs Fix: Switch to POST with credentials in the request body: data = urlencode({"api_key": api_key, "api_secret": api_secret, "from": src, "to": number, "text": msg}) fetch_url(module, NEXMO_API, data=data, method="POST", headers={"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"}) | A flaw was found in the community.general Ansible collection's nexmo module. The module constructs HTTP requests to the Vonage/Nexmo SMS API by encoding API credentials (api_key and api_secret) into URL query parameters and sending them via GET requests. This causes credentials to be exposed in web server access logs, proxy logs, HTTP Referer headers, and network monitoring tools, despite the Ansible argument specification marking these parameters as no_log. An attacker with access to any of these logging or monitoring points can obtain the full API credentials and gain unauthorized access to the victim's Vonage/Nexmo account. |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Redhat community.general
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| Vendors & Products |
Redhat community.general
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
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| References |
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| Metrics |
threat_severity
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threat_severity
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| Description | Module: plugins/modules/nexmo.py CVSS 3.1: 6.5 MEDIUM — AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N Issue: api_key and api_secret are declared no_log=True at the input level, but both credentials are immediately URL-encoded into a GET request as query parameters, bypassing all no_log protection. Vulnerable Code (lines 82-93): msg = { "api_key": module.params.get("api_key"), "api_secret": module.params.get("api_secret"), "from": module.params.get("src"), "text": module.params.get("msg"), } url = f"{NEXMO_API}?{urlencode(msg)}" response, info = fetch_url(module, url, headers=headers) Observed Output: https://rest.nexmo.com/sms/json?api_key=a1b2c3d4&api_secret=MyS3cr3tK3y!!&from=AnsibleBot&to=15551234567&text=Hello Exposure Vectors: Ansible verbose output (-vvv) logs the full request URL Vonage/Nexmo server access logs record credentials in query string HTTP proxies, SIEM, and network inspection tools capture the full URL AWX/Automation Controller network debug logs Fix: Switch to POST with credentials in the request body: data = urlencode({"api_key": api_key, "api_secret": api_secret, "from": src, "to": number, "text": msg}) fetch_url(module, NEXMO_API, data=data, method="POST", headers={"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"}) | |
| Title | Community.general: community.general nexmo — api credentials exposed in get url query string[security] community.general nexmo — api credentials exposed in get url query string | |
| First Time appeared |
Redhat
Redhat enterprise Linux |
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| Weaknesses | CWE-532 | |
| CPEs | cpe:/o:redhat:enterprise_linux:10 cpe:/o:redhat:enterprise_linux:8 cpe:/o:redhat:enterprise_linux:9 |
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| Vendors & Products |
Redhat
Redhat enterprise Linux |
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| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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