Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
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| ConnMan | ConnMan | unknown |
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No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Connman | Connman |
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No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.299% probability within 30 days)
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| Metrics |
ssvc
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| First Time appeared |
Connman
Connman connman |
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| Vendors & Products |
Connman
Connman connman |
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| Title | Stack-Based Buffer Overflow in ConnMan DHCPv6 Processing Allows Crash |
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| Title | Stack-Based Buffer Overflow in ConnMan DHCPv6 Processing Allows Crash |
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| Description | ConnMan through 2.0 has a stack-based buffer overflow via a DHCPv6 Reply message. This occurs in get_domains in gdhcp/client.c. It copies a fixed NS_MAXDNAME (1025) bytes from a DHCPv6 DOMAIN_LIST (option 24) value into a 1026-byte stack buffer dns_name regardless of the actual option length, then walks DNS labels with an unbounded "c += jump + 1" loop. A crafted DHCPv6 REPLY with a DOMAIN_LIST option of >= 1025 non-zero bytes makes the label walk leave the buffer and read/write '.' past its end in attacker-chosen strides. An on-link attacker can trigger this without authentication via a forged Router Advertisement (O=1) and a forged DHCPv6 REPLY matching xid/CLIENTID with a long DOMAIN_LIST. The impact is unauthenticated on-link crash of connmand (runs as root). This was introduced in bb06c47. | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-121 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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