CVE-2026-115700

{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-115700", "assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "EEF", "dateReserved": "2026-10-25T17:30:02.231Z", "datePublished": "2026-10-26T13:49:02.744Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T21:10:51.594Z"}, "containers": {"cna": {"affected": [{"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm", "cpes": ["cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:hackney:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"], "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "modules": ["hackney_url"], "packageName": "hackney", "packageURL": "pkg:hex/hackney", "product": "hackney", "programFiles": ["src/hackney_url.erl"], "programRoutines": [{"name": "hackney_url:normalize/2"}], "repo": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney", "vendor": "benoitc", "versions": [{"lessThan": "4.9.0", "status": "affected", "version": "4.0.1", "versionType": "semver"}]}, {"collectionURL": "https://github.com", "cpes": ["cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:hackney:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"], "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "modules": ["hackney_url"], "packageName": "benoitc/hackney", "packageURL": "pkg:github/benoitc/hackney", "product": "hackney", "programFiles": ["src/hackney_url.erl"], "programRoutines": [{"name": "hackney_url:normalize/2"}], "repo": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney", "vendor": "benoitc", "versions": [{"lessThan": "f19561a0b422376348c91537e51377ab7325f4ee", "status": "affected", "version": "452620a92ec1da2e6b4862a049a2a4f04b42068f", "versionType": "git"}]}], "configurations": [{"lang": "en", "supportingMedia": [{"base64": false, "type": "text/html", "value": "<p>The application passes URLs that an untrusted party can influence to hackney and relies on its own host allowlist, built on <code>uri_string:parse/1</code> or <code>inet:parse_address/1</code>, to keep requests away from internal addresses.</p>"}, {"base64": false, "type": "text/markdown", "value": "The application passes URLs that an untrusted party can influence to hackney and relies on its own host allowlist, built on `uri_string:parse/1` or `inet:parse_address/1`, to keep requests away from internal addresses."}], "value": "The application passes URLs that an untrusted party can influence to hackney and relies on its own host allowlist, built on uri_string:parse/1 or inet:parse_address/1, to keep requests away from internal addresses."}], "cpeApplicability": [{"nodes": [{"cpeMatch": [{"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:hackney:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "versionEndExcluding": "4.9.0", "versionStartIncluding": "4.0.1", "vulnerable": true}], "negate": false, "operator": "OR"}], "operator": "AND"}], "credits": [{"lang": "en", "type": "finder", "value": "Eurico Nicacio"}, {"lang": "en", "type": "reporter", "value": "Eurico Nicacio"}, {"lang": "en", "type": "remediation developer", "value": "Benoit Chesneau"}, {"lang": "en", "type": "coordinator", "value": "Jonatan M\u00e4nnchen / EEF"}], "dateAssigned": "2026-10-26T10:12:09.000Z", "datePublic": "2026-10-25T00:00:00.000Z", "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "supportingMedia": [{"base64": false, "type": "text/html", "value": "<p>Interpretation Conflict vulnerability in <code>hackney_url</code> in benoitc hackney allows Server Side Request Forgery via a percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 literal or an IP literal with a trailing dot. A host such as <code>%5B%3A%3Affff%3A127%2E0%2E0%2E1%5D</code> (decoding to <code>[::ffff:127.0.0.1]</code>) or <code>127.0.0.1.</code> is not an IP address to a caller's allowlist built on <code>uri_string:parse/1</code> and <code>inet:parse_address/1</code>, while hackney connects to the address it denotes. The same applies to a <code>Location</code> target when redirects are followed.</p>\n<p>The IP-literal gate that <code>hackney_url:normalize/2</code> applies to a percent-decoded host, added to close the percent-encoded IP bypass of CVE-2026-47076, passes the decoded value to <code>inet_parse:address/1</code> as is. The connect path in <code>hackney_happy:parse_address/1</code> drops a surrounding bracket pair, and the resolver ignores a trailing dot, so both forms pass the gate and still reach the literal address. Domain names with a trailing dot and unencoded IPv6 literals are not affected.</p>\n<p>This issue affects hackney: from 4.0.1 before 4.9.0.</p>"}, {"base64": false, "type": "text/markdown", "value": "Interpretation Conflict vulnerability in `hackney_url` in benoitc hackney allows Server Side Request Forgery via a percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 literal or an IP literal with a trailing dot. A host such as `%5B%3A%3Affff%3A127%2E0%2E0%2E1%5D` (decoding to `[::ffff:127.0.0.1]`) or `127.0.0.1.` is not an IP address to a caller's allowlist built on `uri_string:parse/1` and `inet:parse_address/1`, while hackney connects to the address it denotes. The same applies to a `Location` target when redirects are followed.\n\nThe IP-literal gate that `hackney_url:normalize/2` applies to a percent-decoded host, added to close the percent-encoded IP bypass of CVE-2026-47076, passes the decoded value to `inet_parse:address/1` as is. The connect path in `hackney_happy:parse_address/1` drops a surrounding bracket pair, and the resolver ignores a trailing dot, so both forms pass the gate and still reach the literal address. Domain names with a trailing dot and unencoded IPv6 literals are not affected.\n\nThis issue affects hackney: from 4.0.1 before 4.9.0."}], "value": "Interpretation Conflict vulnerability in hackney_url in benoitc hackney allows Server Side Request Forgery via a percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 literal or an IP literal with a trailing dot. A host such as %5B%3A%3Affff%3A127%2E0%2E0%2E1%5D (decoding to [::ffff:127.0.0.1]) or 127.0.0.1. is not an IP address to a caller's allowlist built on uri_string:parse/1 and inet:parse_address/1, while hackney connects to the address it denotes. The same applies to a Location target when redirects are followed.\n\nThe IP-literal gate that hackney_url:normalize/2 applies to a percent-decoded host, added to close the percent-encoded IP bypass of CVE-2026-47076, passes the decoded value to inet_parse:address/1 as is. The connect path in hackney_happy:parse_address/1 drops a surrounding bracket pair, and the resolver ignores a trailing dot, so both forms pass the gate and still reach the literal address. Domain names with a trailing dot and unencoded IPv6 literals are not affected.\n\nThis issue affects hackney: from 4.0.1 before 4.9.0."}], "impacts": [{"capecId": "CAPEC-664", "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "supportingMedia": [{"base64": false, "type": "text/html", "value": "<p>An application that checks user-supplied URLs against an IP allowlist before handing them to hackney can be made to request loopback, link-local metadata and private-network addresses that the allowlist rejects when they are written plainly.</p>"}, {"base64": false, "type": "text/markdown", "value": "An application that checks user-supplied URLs against an IP allowlist before handing them to hackney can be made to request loopback, link-local metadata and private-network addresses that the allowlist rejects when they are written plainly."}], "value": "An application that checks user-supplied URLs against an IP allowlist before handing them to hackney can be made to request loopback, link-local metadata and private-network addresses that the allowlist rejects when they are written plainly."}]}], "metrics": [{"cvssV4_0": {"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED", "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED", "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackRequirements": "PRESENT", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "baseScore": 6.9, "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED", "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "userInteraction": "NONE", "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED", "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N", "version": "4.0", "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"}, "format": "CVSS", "scenarios": [{"lang": "en", "value": "GENERAL"}]}], "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"cweId": "CWE-436", "description": "CWE-436 Interpretation Conflict", "lang": "en", "type": "CWE"}]}, {"descriptions": [{"cweId": "CWE-918", "description": "CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "lang": "en", "type": "CWE"}]}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "shortName": "EEF", "dateUpdated": "2026-10-26T13:49:02.744Z"}, "references": [{"name": "hackney 4.9.0 release notes", "tags": ["vendor-advisory", "related"], "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/releases/tag/4.9.0"}, {"name": "EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-115700", "tags": ["related"], "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-115700.html"}, {"name": "OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-115700", "tags": ["related"], "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-115700"}, {"name": "Refuse bracketed and trailing-dot IP literals in normalize/2 (benoitc/hackney#987)", "tags": ["related"], "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/pull/987"}, {"name": "Introducing commit 452620a in benoitc/hackney", "tags": ["related"], "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/452620a92ec1da2e6b4862a049a2a4f04b42068f"}, {"name": "Fix commit f19561a in benoitc/hackney", "tags": ["patch"], "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/f19561a0b422376348c91537e51377ab7325f4ee"}], "source": {"discovery": "EXTERNAL"}, "title": "SSRF allowlist bypass via percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 or trailing-dot IP literal in hackney", "workarounds": [{"lang": "en", "supportingMedia": [{"base64": false, "type": "text/html", "value": "<p>Run the allowlist on the host that <code>hackney_url:normalize/1</code> returns for the parsed URL, and strip a surrounding bracket pair and a trailing dot from it before the IP check, so the check sees the same address the connect path uses.</p>"}, {"base64": false, "type": "text/markdown", "value": "Run the allowlist on the host that `hackney_url:normalize/1` returns for the parsed URL, and strip a surrounding bracket pair and a trailing dot from it before the IP check, so the check sees the same address the connect path uses."}], "value": "Run the allowlist on the host that hackney_url:normalize/1 returns for the parsed URL, and strip a surrounding bracket pair and a trailing dot from it before the IP check, so the check sees the same address the connect path uses."}], "x_technicalAnalysis": [{"lang": "en", "supportingMedia": [{"base64": false, "type": "text/html", "value": "<p><strong>1. The gate.</strong> <code>hackney_url:normalize/2</code> in <code>src/hackney_url.erl</code> percent-decodes a host that is not already an IP literal and raises <code>invalid_url_host</code> when <code>inet_parse:address/1</code> accepts the decoded value. This closed the plain percent-encoded IP case.</p>\n<p><strong>2. What the connect path accepts.</strong> <code>hackney_happy:parse_address/1</code> removes a surrounding <code>[...]</code> pair before calling <code>inet:parse_address/1</code>, and the resolver treats a trailing dot as the root label. Neither form is accepted by <code>inet_parse:address/1</code>, so <code>[::ffff:127.0.0.1]</code> and <code>127.0.0.1.</code> pass the gate.</p>\n<p><strong>3. Result.</strong> A percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 literal such as <code>%5B%3A%3Affff%3A127%2E0%2E0%2E1%5D</code>, or an IPv4 literal with a trailing dot, is not an IP address to a caller's check based on <code>uri_string:parse/1</code> and <code>inet:parse_address/1</code>, but hackney connects to the address it denotes. The same applies to a <code>Location</code> target when redirects are followed. The fix strips one bracket pair and one trailing dot in <code>ip_candidate/1</code> before the gate.</p>"}, {"base64": false, "type": "text/markdown", "value": "**1. The gate.** `hackney_url:normalize/2` in `src/hackney_url.erl` percent-decodes a host that is not already an IP literal and raises `invalid_url_host` when `inet_parse:address/1` accepts the decoded value. This closed the plain percent-encoded IP case.\n\n**2. What the connect path accepts.** `hackney_happy:parse_address/1` removes a surrounding `[...]` pair before calling `inet:parse_address/1`, and the resolver treats a trailing dot as the root label. Neither form is accepted by `inet_parse:address/1`, so `[::ffff:127.0.0.1]` and `127.0.0.1.` pass the gate.\n\n**3. Result.** A percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 literal such as `%5B%3A%3Affff%3A127%2E0%2E0%2E1%5D`, or an IPv4 literal with a trailing dot, is not an IP address to a caller's check based on `uri_string:parse/1` and `inet:parse_address/1`, but hackney connects to the address it denotes. The same applies to a `Location` target when redirects are followed. The fix strips one bracket pair and one trailing dot in `ip_candidate/1` before the gate."}], "value": "1. The gate. hackney_url:normalize/2 in src/hackney_url.erl percent-decodes a host that is not already an IP literal and raises invalid_url_host when inet_parse:address/1 accepts the decoded value. This closed the plain percent-encoded IP case.\n\n2. What the connect path accepts. hackney_happy:parse_address/1 removes a surrounding [...] pair before calling inet:parse_address/1, and the resolver treats a trailing dot as the root label. Neither form is accepted by inet_parse:address/1, so [::ffff:127.0.0.1] and 127.0.0.1. pass the gate.\n\n3. Result. A percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 literal such as %5B%3A%3Affff%3A127%2E0%2E0%2E1%5D, or an IPv4 literal with a trailing dot, is not an IP address to a caller's check based on uri_string:parse/1 and inet:parse_address/1, but hackney connects to the address it denotes. The same applies to a Location target when redirects are followed. The fix strips one bracket pair and one trailing dot in ip_candidate/1 before the gate."}]}, "adp": [{"metrics": [{"other": {"type": "ssvc", "content": {"timestamp": "2026-11-02T21:09:31.457510Z", "id": "CVE-2026-115700", "options": [{"Exploitation": "none"}, {"Automatable": "no"}, {"Technical Impact": "partial"}], "role": "CISA Coordinator", "version": "2.0.3"}}}], "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment", "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "shortName": "CISA-ADP", "dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T21:10:51.594Z"}}]}}

{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "containers": {"adp": [{"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment", "metrics": [{"other": {"type": "ssvc", "content": {"id": "CVE-2026-115700", "role": "CISA Coordinator", "options": [{"Exploitation": "none"}, {"Automatable": "no"}, {"Technical Impact": "partial"}], "version": "2.0.3", "timestamp": "2026-11-02T21:09:31.457510Z"}}}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "shortName": "CISA-ADP", "dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T21:10:45.638Z"}}], "cna": {"title": "SSRF allowlist bypass via percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 or trailing-dot IP literal in hackney", "source": {"discovery": "EXTERNAL"}, "credits": [{"lang": "en", "type": "finder", "value": "Eurico Nicacio"}, {"lang": "en", "type": "reporter", "value": "Eurico Nicacio"}, {"lang": "en", "type": "remediation developer", "value": "Benoit Chesneau"}, {"lang": "en", "type": "coordinator", "value": "Jonatan M\u00e4nnchen / EEF"}], "impacts": [{"capecId": "CAPEC-664", "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "An application that checks user-supplied URLs against an IP allowlist before handing them to hackney can be made to request loopback, link-local metadata and private-network addresses that the allowlist rejects when they are written plainly.", "supportingMedia": [{"type": "text/html", "value": "<p>An application that checks user-supplied URLs against an IP allowlist before handing them to hackney can be made to request loopback, link-local metadata and private-network addresses that the allowlist rejects when they are written plainly.</p>", "base64": false}, {"type": "text/markdown", "value": "An application that checks user-supplied URLs against an IP allowlist before handing them to hackney can be made to request loopback, link-local metadata and private-network addresses that the allowlist rejects when they are written plainly.", "base64": false}]}]}], "metrics": [{"format": "CVSS", "cvssV4_0": {"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED", "version": "4.0", "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED", "baseScore": 6.9, "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED", "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N", "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackRequirements": "PRESENT", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"}, "scenarios": [{"lang": "en", "value": "GENERAL"}]}], "affected": [{"cpes": ["cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:hackney:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"], "repo": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney", "vendor": "benoitc", "modules": ["hackney_url"], "product": "hackney", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "4.0.1", "lessThan": "4.9.0", "versionType": "semver"}], "packageURL": "pkg:hex/hackney", "packageName": "hackney", "programFiles": ["src/hackney_url.erl"], "collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm", "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "programRoutines": [{"name": "hackney_url:normalize/2"}]}, {"cpes": ["cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:hackney:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"], "repo": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney", "vendor": "benoitc", "modules": ["hackney_url"], "product": "hackney", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "452620a92ec1da2e6b4862a049a2a4f04b42068f", "lessThan": "f19561a0b422376348c91537e51377ab7325f4ee", "versionType": "git"}], "packageURL": "pkg:github/benoitc/hackney", "packageName": "benoitc/hackney", "programFiles": ["src/hackney_url.erl"], "collectionURL": "https://github.com", "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "programRoutines": [{"name": "hackney_url:normalize/2"}]}], "datePublic": "2026-10-25T00:00:00.000Z", "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/releases/tag/4.9.0", "name": "hackney 4.9.0 release notes", "tags": ["vendor-advisory", "related"]}, {"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-115700.html", "name": "EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-115700", "tags": ["related"]}, {"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-115700", "name": "OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-115700", "tags": ["related"]}, {"url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/pull/987", "name": "Refuse bracketed and trailing-dot IP literals in normalize/2 (benoitc/hackney#987)", "tags": ["related"]}, {"url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/452620a92ec1da2e6b4862a049a2a4f04b42068f", "name": "Introducing commit 452620a in benoitc/hackney", "tags": ["related"]}, {"url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/f19561a0b422376348c91537e51377ab7325f4ee", "name": "Fix commit f19561a in benoitc/hackney", "tags": ["patch"]}], "workarounds": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Run the allowlist on the host that hackney_url:normalize/1 returns for the parsed URL, and strip a surrounding bracket pair and a trailing dot from it before the IP check, so the check sees the same address the connect path uses.", "supportingMedia": [{"type": "text/html", "value": "<p>Run the allowlist on the host that <code>hackney_url:normalize/1</code> returns for the parsed URL, and strip a surrounding bracket pair and a trailing dot from it before the IP check, so the check sees the same address the connect path uses.</p>", "base64": false}, {"type": "text/markdown", "value": "Run the allowlist on the host that `hackney_url:normalize/1` returns for the parsed URL, and strip a surrounding bracket pair and a trailing dot from it before the IP check, so the check sees the same address the connect path uses.", "base64": false}]}], "dateAssigned": "2026-10-26T10:12:09.000Z", "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Interpretation Conflict vulnerability in hackney_url in benoitc hackney allows Server Side Request Forgery via a percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 literal or an IP literal with a trailing dot. A host such as %5B%3A%3Affff%3A127%2E0%2E0%2E1%5D (decoding to [::ffff:127.0.0.1]) or 127.0.0.1. is not an IP address to a caller's allowlist built on uri_string:parse/1 and inet:parse_address/1, while hackney connects to the address it denotes. The same applies to a Location target when redirects are followed.\n\nThe IP-literal gate that hackney_url:normalize/2 applies to a percent-decoded host, added to close the percent-encoded IP bypass of CVE-2026-47076, passes the decoded value to inet_parse:address/1 as is. The connect path in hackney_happy:parse_address/1 drops a surrounding bracket pair, and the resolver ignores a trailing dot, so both forms pass the gate and still reach the literal address. Domain names with a trailing dot and unencoded IPv6 literals are not affected.\n\nThis issue affects hackney: from 4.0.1 before 4.9.0.", "supportingMedia": [{"type": "text/html", "value": "<p>Interpretation Conflict vulnerability in <code>hackney_url</code> in benoitc hackney allows Server Side Request Forgery via a percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 literal or an IP literal with a trailing dot. A host such as <code>%5B%3A%3Affff%3A127%2E0%2E0%2E1%5D</code> (decoding to <code>[::ffff:127.0.0.1]</code>) or <code>127.0.0.1.</code> is not an IP address to a caller's allowlist built on <code>uri_string:parse/1</code> and <code>inet:parse_address/1</code>, while hackney connects to the address it denotes. The same applies to a <code>Location</code> target when redirects are followed.</p>\n<p>The IP-literal gate that <code>hackney_url:normalize/2</code> applies to a percent-decoded host, added to close the percent-encoded IP bypass of CVE-2026-47076, passes the decoded value to <code>inet_parse:address/1</code> as is. The connect path in <code>hackney_happy:parse_address/1</code> drops a surrounding bracket pair, and the resolver ignores a trailing dot, so both forms pass the gate and still reach the literal address. Domain names with a trailing dot and unencoded IPv6 literals are not affected.</p>\n<p>This issue affects hackney: from 4.0.1 before 4.9.0.</p>", "base64": false}, {"type": "text/markdown", "value": "Interpretation Conflict vulnerability in `hackney_url` in benoitc hackney allows Server Side Request Forgery via a percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 literal or an IP literal with a trailing dot. A host such as `%5B%3A%3Affff%3A127%2E0%2E0%2E1%5D` (decoding to `[::ffff:127.0.0.1]`) or `127.0.0.1.` is not an IP address to a caller's allowlist built on `uri_string:parse/1` and `inet:parse_address/1`, while hackney connects to the address it denotes. The same applies to a `Location` target when redirects are followed.\n\nThe IP-literal gate that `hackney_url:normalize/2` applies to a percent-decoded host, added to close the percent-encoded IP bypass of CVE-2026-47076, passes the decoded value to `inet_parse:address/1` as is. The connect path in `hackney_happy:parse_address/1` drops a surrounding bracket pair, and the resolver ignores a trailing dot, so both forms pass the gate and still reach the literal address. Domain names with a trailing dot and unencoded IPv6 literals are not affected.\n\nThis issue affects hackney: from 4.0.1 before 4.9.0.", "base64": false}]}], "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "type": "CWE", "cweId": "CWE-436", "description": "CWE-436 Interpretation Conflict"}]}, {"descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "type": "CWE", "cweId": "CWE-918", "description": "CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)"}]}], "configurations": [{"lang": "en", "value": "The application passes URLs that an untrusted party can influence to hackney and relies on its own host allowlist, built on uri_string:parse/1 or inet:parse_address/1, to keep requests away from internal addresses.", "supportingMedia": [{"type": "text/html", "value": "<p>The application passes URLs that an untrusted party can influence to hackney and relies on its own host allowlist, built on <code>uri_string:parse/1</code> or <code>inet:parse_address/1</code>, to keep requests away from internal addresses.</p>", "base64": false}, {"type": "text/markdown", "value": "The application passes URLs that an untrusted party can influence to hackney and relies on its own host allowlist, built on `uri_string:parse/1` or `inet:parse_address/1`, to keep requests away from internal addresses.", "base64": false}]}], "cpeApplicability": [{"nodes": [{"negate": false, "cpeMatch": [{"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:hackney:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "vulnerable": true, "versionEndExcluding": "4.9.0", "versionStartIncluding": "4.0.1"}], "operator": "OR"}], "operator": "AND"}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "shortName": "EEF", "dateUpdated": "2026-10-26T13:49:02.744Z"}, "x_technicalAnalysis": [{"lang": "en", "value": "1. The gate. hackney_url:normalize/2 in src/hackney_url.erl percent-decodes a host that is not already an IP literal and raises invalid_url_host when inet_parse:address/1 accepts the decoded value. This closed the plain percent-encoded IP case.\n\n2. What the connect path accepts. hackney_happy:parse_address/1 removes a surrounding [...] pair before calling inet:parse_address/1, and the resolver treats a trailing dot as the root label. Neither form is accepted by inet_parse:address/1, so [::ffff:127.0.0.1] and 127.0.0.1. pass the gate.\n\n3. Result. A percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 literal such as %5B%3A%3Affff%3A127%2E0%2E0%2E1%5D, or an IPv4 literal with a trailing dot, is not an IP address to a caller's check based on uri_string:parse/1 and inet:parse_address/1, but hackney connects to the address it denotes. The same applies to a Location target when redirects are followed. The fix strips one bracket pair and one trailing dot in ip_candidate/1 before the gate.", "supportingMedia": [{"type": "text/html", "value": "<p><strong>1. The gate.</strong> <code>hackney_url:normalize/2</code> in <code>src/hackney_url.erl</code> percent-decodes a host that is not already an IP literal and raises <code>invalid_url_host</code> when <code>inet_parse:address/1</code> accepts the decoded value. This closed the plain percent-encoded IP case.</p>\n<p><strong>2. What the connect path accepts.</strong> <code>hackney_happy:parse_address/1</code> removes a surrounding <code>[...]</code> pair before calling <code>inet:parse_address/1</code>, and the resolver treats a trailing dot as the root label. Neither form is accepted by <code>inet_parse:address/1</code>, so <code>[::ffff:127.0.0.1]</code> and <code>127.0.0.1.</code> pass the gate.</p>\n<p><strong>3. Result.</strong> A percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 literal such as <code>%5B%3A%3Affff%3A127%2E0%2E0%2E1%5D</code>, or an IPv4 literal with a trailing dot, is not an IP address to a caller's check based on <code>uri_string:parse/1</code> and <code>inet:parse_address/1</code>, but hackney connects to the address it denotes. The same applies to a <code>Location</code> target when redirects are followed. The fix strips one bracket pair and one trailing dot in <code>ip_candidate/1</code> before the gate.</p>", "base64": false}, {"type": "text/markdown", "value": "**1. The gate.** `hackney_url:normalize/2` in `src/hackney_url.erl` percent-decodes a host that is not already an IP literal and raises `invalid_url_host` when `inet_parse:address/1` accepts the decoded value. This closed the plain percent-encoded IP case.\n\n**2. What the connect path accepts.** `hackney_happy:parse_address/1` removes a surrounding `[...]` pair before calling `inet:parse_address/1`, and the resolver treats a trailing dot as the root label. Neither form is accepted by `inet_parse:address/1`, so `[::ffff:127.0.0.1]` and `127.0.0.1.` pass the gate.\n\n**3. Result.** A percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 literal such as `%5B%3A%3Affff%3A127%2E0%2E0%2E1%5D`, or an IPv4 literal with a trailing dot, is not an IP address to a caller's check based on `uri_string:parse/1` and `inet:parse_address/1`, but hackney connects to the address it denotes. The same applies to a `Location` target when redirects are followed. The fix strips one bracket pair and one trailing dot in `ip_candidate/1` before the gate.", "base64": false}]}]}}, "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-115700", "state": "PUBLISHED", "dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T21:10:51.594Z", "dateReserved": "2026-10-25T17:30:02.231Z", "assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "datePublished": "2026-10-26T13:49:02.744Z", "assignerShortName": "EEF"}, "dataVersion": "5.2"}

{"affected": [{"affectedData": [{"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm", "cpes": ["cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:hackney:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"], "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "modules": ["hackney_url"], "packageName": "hackney", "packageURL": "pkg:hex/hackney", "product": "hackney", "programFiles": ["src/hackney_url.erl"], "programRoutines": [{"name": "hackney_url:normalize/2"}], "repo": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney", "vendor": "benoitc", "versions": [{"lessThan": "4.9.0", "status": "affected", "version": "4.0.1", "versionType": "semver"}]}, {"collectionURL": "https://github.com", "cpes": ["cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:hackney:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"], "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "modules": ["hackney_url"], "packageName": "benoitc/hackney", "packageURL": "pkg:github/benoitc/hackney", "product": "hackney", "programFiles": ["src/hackney_url.erl"], "programRoutines": [{"name": "hackney_url:normalize/2"}], "repo": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney", "vendor": "benoitc", "versions": [{"lessThan": "f19561a0b422376348c91537e51377ab7325f4ee", "status": "affected", "version": "452620a92ec1da2e6b4862a049a2a4f04b42068f", "versionType": "git"}]}], "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db"}], "cveTags": [], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Interpretation Conflict vulnerability in hackney_url in benoitc hackney allows Server Side Request Forgery via a percent-encoded bracketed IPv6 literal or an IP literal with a trailing dot. A host such as %5B%3A%3Affff%3A127%2E0%2E0%2E1%5D (decoding to [::ffff:127.0.0.1]) or 127.0.0.1. is not an IP address to a caller's allowlist built on uri_string:parse/1 and inet:parse_address/1, while hackney connects to the address it denotes. The same applies to a Location target when redirects are followed.\n\nThe IP-literal gate that hackney_url:normalize/2 applies to a percent-decoded host, added to close the percent-encoded IP bypass of CVE-2026-47076, passes the decoded value to inet_parse:address/1 as is. The connect path in hackney_happy:parse_address/1 drops a surrounding bracket pair, and the resolver ignores a trailing dot, so both forms pass the gate and still reach the literal address. Domain names with a trailing dot and unencoded IPv6 literals are not affected.\n\nThis issue affects hackney: from 4.0.1 before 4.9.0."}], "id": "CVE-2026-115700", "lastModified": "2026-11-02T21:17:24.547", "metrics": {"cvssMetricV40": [{"cvssData": {"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED", "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED", "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackRequirements": "PRESENT", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "baseScore": 6.9, "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED", "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED", "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "subConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "userInteraction": "NONE", "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED", "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X", "version": "4.0", "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"}, "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "type": "Secondary"}], "ssvcV203": [{"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "ssvcData": {"id": "CVE-2026-115700", "options": [{"exploitation": "none"}, {"automatable": "no"}, {"technicalImpact": "partial"}], "role": "CISA Coordinator", "timestamp": "2026-11-02T21:09:31.457510Z", "version": "2.0.3"}}]}, "published": "2026-10-26T14:16:32.080", "references": [{"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-115700.html"}, {"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/452620a92ec1da2e6b4862a049a2a4f04b42068f"}, {"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/commit/f19561a0b422376348c91537e51377ab7325f4ee"}, {"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/pull/987"}, {"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "url": "https://github.com/benoitc/hackney/releases/tag/4.9.0"}, {"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-115700"}], "sourceIdentifier": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis", "weaknesses": [{"description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-436"}, {"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-918"}], "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "type": "Secondary"}]}

{}

{"affected": [{"configurations": [{"platform": null, "status": "affected", "versions": {"scheme": "semver", "value": "[4.0.1,4.9.0)"}}], "enrichment": {"confidence": 95.0, "confidence_source": "inferred", "scores": [{"score": 95.0, "source": "inferred"}, {"score": 100.0, "source": "matching"}]}, "original": {"product": "hackney", "source": "cna", "vendor": "benoitc"}, "product": "hackney", "vendor": "benoitc"}, {"configurations": [{"platform": null, "status": "affected", "versions": {"scheme": "code_commit", "value": "[452620a92ec1da2e6b4862a049a2a4f04b42068f,f19561a0b422376348c91537e51377ab7325f4ee)"}}], "enrichment": {"confidence": 95.0, "confidence_source": "inferred", "scores": [{"score": 95.0, "source": "inferred"}, {"score": 100.0, "source": "matching"}]}, "original": {"product": "hackney", "source": "cna", "vendor": "benoitc"}, "product": "hackney", "vendor": "benoitc"}], "created": "2026-10-26T16:00:18.057892+00:00", "updated": "2026-10-26T16:15:14.281352+00:00", "vendors": ["benoitc", "benoitc$PRODUCT$hackney"]}