obsidian-tc: Declined human-in-the-loop confirmations can permit destructive calls over HTTP
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
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| The-40-Thieves | obsidian-tc | affected |
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| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
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| The-40-thieves | Obsidian-tc |
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| Source | ID | Title |
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Github GHSA |
GHSA-737x-cwfr-5vvc | obsidian-tc: Declined human-in-the-loop confirmations can permit destructive calls over HTTP |
No CVSS v3.1
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.354% probability within 30 days)
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| Metrics |
ssvc
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| First Time appeared |
The-40-thieves
The-40-thieves obsidian-tc |
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| Vendors & Products |
The-40-thieves
The-40-thieves obsidian-tc |
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| Description | obsidian-tc is a governed, agent-ready Model Context Protocol server for Obsidian vaults. From 1.13.0 until 1.31.4, on a Streamable HTTP deployment with `auth.jwtSecret` configured and a 2026-07-28-era client declaring `elicitation.form` support, a dispatch-gated tool call offered an `inputRequired` confirmation could still complete after the human declined or cancelled, or the elicitation response was omitted or malformed, provided the client echoed the validly bound `requestState` on resubmission. The server trusted an authentic, call-bound state as proof of approval even though that state was minted before the `elicitation/create` leg was asked and proved only that the resubmission belonged to the same call. A client behaving incorrectly or under an attacker's control could therefore execute dispatch-gated destructive vault operations without the human's approval, while still requiring the caller's ordinary tool permissions. Only tools marked `destructive: true` or requiring a scope with a human-in-the-loop floor were reachable through this bypass. The sixteen handler-side conditionally gated tools, including `write_note` overwrite and `move_note`, did not read elicitation state on the modern wire and let neither approval nor decline through that path. Affected deployments using stdio or leaving `auth.jwtSecret` unset instead used the CLI `elicit_token` fallback and did not offer this `requestState` round trip. The fix does not prevent a malicious client from reporting a fabricated approval, because the server cannot verify that the client displayed the form or that a human saw it. This issue is fixed in version 1.31.4. | |
| Title | obsidian-tc: Declined human-in-the-loop confirmations can permit destructive calls over HTTP | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-285 CWE-863 |
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| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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