draw.io Desktop: Arbitrary local-file read via read-side IPC (no blessed-path gate)
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
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| jgraph | drawio-desktop | affected |
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No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
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| Jgraph | Drawio-desktop |
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No CVSS v3.1
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.356% probability within 30 days)
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ssvc
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| First Time appeared |
Jgraph
Jgraph drawio-desktop |
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| Vendors & Products |
Jgraph
Jgraph drawio-desktop |
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| Description | draw.io Desktop is the official Electron build of draw.io. Prior to 31.4.4, draw.io Desktop is vulnerable to arbitrary local-file disclosure through the Electron main process's read-side IPC handlers. The readFile, getFileDrafts, getBkpFile, fileStat, isFileWritable, checkFileExists, and watchFile actions operate on a renderer-chosen filesystem path with no blessed-path (assertWritablePath) authorization. The only gates are validateSender — a URL-prefix origin check — plus, for readFile alone, a content "sniff" and a lexical appBaseDir prefix block. The write-side handlers (saveFile, writeFile, saveDraft, deleteFile) are all protected by assertWritablePath; the read side is not. The result is a read/write authorization asymmetry: any frame executing in the app's file:// origin can read the contents of local files that the same origin is explicitly forbidden to write. This issue is fixed in version 31.4.4. | |
| Title | draw.io Desktop: Arbitrary local-file read via read-side IPC (no blessed-path gate) | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-200 CWE-22 |
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| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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