Chi Client IP Spoofing in ClientIPFromXFF via X-Forwarded-For
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
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| go-chi | chi | unaffected |
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| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
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| Go-chi | Chi |
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| Source | ID | Title |
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Github GHSA |
GHSA-j6qf-3m9c-vwj3 | chi: Client IP spoofing in ClientIPFromXFF via X-Forwarded-For |
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.129% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| Metrics |
ssvc
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-346 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
threat_severity
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threat_severity
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Go-chi
Go-chi chi |
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| Vendors & Products |
Go-chi
Go-chi chi |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Golang Chi web framework, the ClientIPFromXFF middleware skips any X-Forwarded-For entry in a configured trusted CIDR but never verifies that the direct TCP peer in http.Request.RemoteAddr belongs to that CIDR. A client that can reach the Go server directly can therefore append a trusted-looking proxy address and choose the client IP returned by middleware.GetClientIP. This issue affects chi before 5.4.0. | |
| Title | Chi Client IP Spoofing in ClientIPFromXFF via X-Forwarded-For | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-348 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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