DLL search order hijacking via screenhooks libraries in TightVNC Server
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GlavSoft | TightVNC | unaffected |
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No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Glavsoft | Tightvnc |
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Vendor Solution
Upgrade TightVNC for Windows to version 2.8.88 or later.
Vendor Workaround
Ensure the TightVNC installation directory and every directory on the system PATH are writable only by administrators.
No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.140% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Glavsoft
Glavsoft tightvnc |
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| Vendors & Products |
Glavsoft
Glavsoft tightvnc |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | An uncontrolled search path element vulnerability in GlavSoft TightVNC Server for Windows before 2.8.88 allows a local authenticated user to execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges. DynamicLibrary::init() (and ThemeLib) load screenhooks32.dll / screenhooks64.dll with LoadLibrary() using a bare file name and no LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_* flags, so the TightVNC service follows the default DLL search order and loads an attacker-planted DLL from a writable directory earlier in that order (for example, an installation directory with permissive ACLs). | |
| Title | DLL search order hijacking via screenhooks libraries in TightVNC Server | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-427 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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