Authentication Bypass by Spoofing in Malcolm
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | |||||||||
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| CISA | Malcolm | unaffected |
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No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cisagov | Malcolm |
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Vendor Solution
Update to version v26.08.0
No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.241% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| Metrics |
ssvc
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Cisagov
Cisagov malcolm |
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| Vendors & Products |
Cisagov
Cisagov malcolm |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Malcolm's front nginx reverse proxy defines a "Dashboards → Arkime shortcut" location using a case-insensitive regex matcher but a case-sensitive rewrite. A request whose path segment is not exact-lowercase (for example /IDDASH2ARK/...) enters the location (the matcher fires) but evades the rewrite (no redirect is issued), so nginx falls through to the location's proxy_pass to the Arkime backend. That location is the one proxied location in the shipped config that does not include the per-location authentication file, so the request reaches Arkime unauthenticated. The same location also forwards a client-supplied X-Forwarded-User header un-overwritten, and Arkime is configured to trust X-Forwarded-User as the authenticated username — so an unauthenticated network caller can reach the Arkime backend while supplying a forged, auto-provisioned identity. | |
| Title | Authentication Bypass by Spoofing in Malcolm | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-290 CWE-441 CWE-863 |
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| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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