Out-of-bounds read in Zephyr DNS resolver TXT/SRV record parsing (unvalidated `rdlength`)
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | |||||||||
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| zephyrproject | zephyr | unaffected |
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No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
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| Zephyrproject | Zephyr |
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No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.415% probability within 30 days)
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| First Time appeared |
Zephyrproject
Zephyrproject zephyr |
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| Vendors & Products |
Zephyrproject
Zephyrproject zephyr |
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| Metrics |
ssvc
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| Description | Zephyr's DNS resolver (subsys/net/lib/dns) parses resource records from DNS responses in dns_unpack_answer(), which validated only the fixed RR header (type, class, TTL, rdlength) and accepted any attacker-declared rdlength, including one extending past the end of the received datagram. The TXT and SRV consumers in dns_validate_record() (resolve.c) then read up to rdlength bytes (clamped only to a record-type maximum such as DNS_MAX_TEXT_SIZE, default 64, not to the packet) from the receive buffer via memcpy without their own bounds check, and pass the result to the application's resolve callback. A malicious or spoofed DNS server, an on-path attacker forging UDP DNS replies, or (with mDNS/LLMNR enabled) any LAN node can craft a truncated TXT or SRV response that causes an out-of-bounds read of adjacent receive-pool memory; the disclosed stale bytes (residual contents of prior DNS packets / uninitialized pool memory) are returned to the application as TXT/SRV record contents, an information leak, and may in some configurations cross the allocation boundary and fault, causing a denial of service. The read is bounded (~64 bytes for TXT, ~6 for SRV) and read-only (no write). The fix rejects any record whose declared rdata extends past dns_msg->msg_size at the single chokepoint in dns_unpack_answer(). Affected: v4.3.0 and v4.4.0. | |
| Title | Out-of-bounds read in Zephyr DNS resolver TXT/SRV record parsing (unvalidated `rdlength`) | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-125 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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