Missing HelloVerifyRequest cookie validation in the NetX Secure DTLS server
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Eclipse Foundation | Eclipse ThreadX NetX Duo | unaffected |
|
No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Eclipse | Netx Duo |
|
No CVSS v3.1
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.374% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | The NetX Secure DTLS server sends a HelloVerifyRequest carrying a freshly generated cookie, but never checks the cookie a client returns. The ClientHello parser copies the client's cookie bytes over the value the server issued, and the server then decides whether the client has been verified from the cookie's length alone. A peer that puts any single cookie byte in its first ClientHello skips the verification exchange entirely, so the server has no return-routability check and completes handshakes for forged source addresses. | In Eclipse ThreadX NetX Duo versions 6.0 through 6.5.2.202603, the NetX Secure DTLS server never compares the cookie a client returns with the one it issued, and treats any non-empty cookie as verified. A remote attacker can make the server send its full handshake flight, several kilobytes, to a forged source address, using it to reflect amplified traffic at a third party. |
| Title | NetX Duo DTLS Server Bypasses Cookie Validation, Enabling Forged Connections | Missing HelloVerifyRequest cookie validation in the NetX Secure DTLS server |
| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
|
cvssV4_0
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Eclipse
Eclipse netx Duo |
|
| Vendors & Products |
Eclipse
Eclipse netx Duo |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Title | NetX Duo DTLS Server Bypasses Cookie Validation, Enabling Forged Connections |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | The NetX Secure DTLS server sends a HelloVerifyRequest carrying a freshly generated cookie, but never checks the cookie a client returns. The ClientHello parser copies the client's cookie bytes over the value the server issued, and the server then decides whether the client has been verified from the cookie's length alone. A peer that puts any single cookie byte in its first ClientHello skips the verification exchange entirely, so the server has no return-routability check and completes handshakes for forged source addresses. | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-290 CWE-406 |
|
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
|