Rox Appointment Booking <= 1.3.1 - Unauthenticated Privilege Escalation via Mass Assignment to Mass Assignment via '/public/booking' Endpoint
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
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| roxnor | Rox Appointment Booking – Event, Calendar & Appointment Scheduling | unaffected |
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No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Roxnor | Rox Appointment Booking – Event, Calendar & Appointment Scheduling |
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| Wordpress-extensions | Rox Appointment Booking |
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No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.281% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| First Time appeared |
Roxnor
Roxnor rox Appointment Booking – Event, Calendar & Appointment Scheduling Wordpress-extensions Wordpress-extensions rox Appointment Booking |
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| Vendors & Products |
Roxnor
Roxnor rox Appointment Booking – Event, Calendar & Appointment Scheduling Wordpress-extensions Wordpress-extensions rox Appointment Booking |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| Metrics |
ssvc
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| Description | The Rox Appointment Booking – Appointment Booking Scheduling Solution plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via Mass Assignment in all versions up to, and including, 1.3.1 This is due to the public `/rox-appointment-booking/v1/public/booking` REST endpoint performing mass-assignment of the raw request body into a new customer row while `CustomerModel::$fillable` includes the internal `wp_user_id` column, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to persist an arbitrary WordPress user ID alongside an attacker-controlled email address with no authorization check. When an administrator subsequently opens the poisoned customer record and clicks Update Customer, `SaveCustomer::handleRequest()` passes the stored `wp_user_id` and attacker-supplied email to `wp_update_user()` — succeeding because `LinkedAccount::canChange()` unconditionally returns true when the acting user holds the `edit_users` capability — thereby overwriting the targeted administrator's email address and enabling full account takeover via a standard WordPress password-reset request. Successful exploitation requires an administrator to open and save the poisoned record, and the attacker must know or guess a valid administrator user ID (such as the default user ID 1). | |
| Title | Rox Appointment Booking <= 1.3.1 - Unauthenticated Privilege Escalation via Mass Assignment to Mass Assignment via '/public/booking' Endpoint | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-269 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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