CVE-2026-102716

A malformed Session header permanently orphans one packet-pool block per RTSP request

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Published Sep 29, 2026 CVSS 4.0 · 8.7 High EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
In Eclipse ThreadX NetX Duo versions up to and including 6.5.2.202603, the RTSP server returns a raw parser error for a malformed Session header and never releases the response packet it allocated. An unauthenticated client can drain the server's packet pool with a few dozen requests, stopping the RTSP server and, where the pool is shared, the rest of the network stack until the device restarts.

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record

Tracking

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Advisories

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History
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description An unauthenticated client can drain the RTSP server's packet pool with a couple of dozen requests that carry a Session header the parser cannot convert. The Session branch returns the raw NetX error code instead of an RTSP status code: ```c /* addons/rtsp/nx_rtsp_server.c:2754 */ status = _nx_utility_string_to_uint(field_value_ptr, field_value_length, &session_id); if (status) { return(status); /* NX_INVALID_PARAMETERS / NX_SIZE_ERROR / NX_OVERFLOW */ } ``` Every other branch of the same function maps its failure to an RTSP status first. The CSeq branch eighteen lines earlier does exactly that (line 2736 returns NX_RTSP_STATUS_CODE_BAD_REQUEST). The raw code then reaches `_nx_rtsp_server_error_response_send` (nx_rtsp_server.c:1234), which does not recognise it, takes a path that returns without releasing the response packet it already allocated, and the block never goes back to the pool. Six requests with an empty Session header against a 22 packet pool: ``` valid requests: after request 6: pool available = 21, AFTER = 22 / 22 malformed requests: after request 6: pool available = 16, AFTER = 17 / 22 ``` One block per request, not returned when the client disconnects. Twenty six requests take the pool to zero and the server starts failing allocations, after which it serves nobody. If the pool is shared with the rest of the application, as it is in the shipped sample, the rest of the stack stops with it. Convert the `_nx_utility_string_to_uint` failure in the Session branch into NX_RTSP_STATUS_CODE_BAD_REQUEST the way the CSeq branch does, and release the response packet on every exit path of `_nx_rtsp_server_error_response_send`. In Eclipse ThreadX NetX Duo versions up to and including 6.5.2.202603, the RTSP server returns a raw parser error for a malformed Session header and never releases the response packet it allocated. An unauthenticated client can drain the server's packet pool with a few dozen requests, stopping the RTSP server and, where the pool is shared, the rest of the network stack until the device restarts.
Title Unauthenticated RTSP Requests Can Drain Packet Pool Causing Denial of Service A malformed Session header permanently orphans one packet-pool block per RTSP request
Weaknesses CWE-755
Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Eclipse
Eclipse threadx Netx Duo
Vendors & Products Eclipse
Eclipse threadx Netx Duo
Type Values Removed Values Added
Title Unauthenticated RTSP Requests Can Drain Packet Pool Causing Denial of Service
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'yes', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}
Type Values Removed Values Added
Description An unauthenticated client can drain the RTSP server's packet pool with a couple of dozen requests that carry a Session header the parser cannot convert. The Session branch returns the raw NetX error code instead of an RTSP status code: ```c /* addons/rtsp/nx_rtsp_server.c:2754 */ status = _nx_utility_string_to_uint(field_value_ptr, field_value_length, &session_id); if (status) { return(status); /* NX_INVALID_PARAMETERS / NX_SIZE_ERROR / NX_OVERFLOW */ } ``` Every other branch of the same function maps its failure to an RTSP status first. The CSeq branch eighteen lines earlier does exactly that (line 2736 returns NX_RTSP_STATUS_CODE_BAD_REQUEST). The raw code then reaches `_nx_rtsp_server_error_response_send` (nx_rtsp_server.c:1234), which does not recognise it, takes a path that returns without releasing the response packet it already allocated, and the block never goes back to the pool. Six requests with an empty Session header against a 22 packet pool: ``` valid requests: after request 6: pool available = 21, AFTER = 22 / 22 malformed requests: after request 6: pool available = 16, AFTER = 17 / 22 ``` One block per request, not returned when the client disconnects. Twenty six requests take the pool to zero and the server starts failing allocations, after which it serves nobody. If the pool is shared with the rest of the application, as it is in the shipped sample, the rest of the stack stops with it. Convert the `_nx_utility_string_to_uint` failure in the Session branch into NX_RTSP_STATUS_CODE_BAD_REQUEST the way the CSeq branch does, and release the response packet on every exit path of `_nx_rtsp_server_error_response_send`.
Weaknesses CWE-401
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 8.7, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}
Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
eclipse
Published
Updated
Nov 4, 2026, 1:15 PM
Reserved
Sep 29, 2026, 4:15 PM

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Updated
Sep 29, 2026, 6:41 PM

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Status
Awaiting Analysis
Published
Sep 29, 2026, 6:17 PM
Modified
Nov 4, 2026, 2:17 PM

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No data.

Updated
Nov 4, 2026, 3:15 PM

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