Out-of-bounds read in the NetX Secure DTLS ClientHello parser
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | |||||||||
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| Eclipse Foundation | Eclipse ThreadX NetX Duo | unaffected |
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No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Eclipse | Netx Duo |
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No CVSS v3.1
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.253% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | On the first DTLS ClientHello, the parser copies a device-claimed session_id length and validates the ciphersuite-list length against the total record length instead of the remaining bytes. An unauthenticated peer drives an OOB source read of up to 255 bytes, and those bytes are echoed verbatim into the outgoing ServerHello, disclosing adjacent process memory over the network. The crash variant fires on the first packet. | In Eclipse ThreadX NetX Duo versions up to and including 6.5.2.202603, built with DTLS server support, the NetX Secure DTLS server's ClientHello parser reads the session ID, cookie and ciphersuite list without bounding them by the bytes remaining in the message. An unauthenticated peer can send a ClientHello declaring fields longer than the message and make the server read past it; nothing read is sent back to the peer, and the read can fault the server only on targets that trap the address beyond the buffer. |
| Title | DTLS ClientHello Out-of-Bounds Read Exposes Process Memory | Out-of-bounds read in the NetX Secure DTLS ClientHello parser |
| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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cvssV4_0
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Eclipse
Eclipse netx Duo |
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| Vendors & Products |
Eclipse
Eclipse netx Duo |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Title | DTLS ClientHello Out-of-Bounds Read Exposes Process Memory |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | On the first DTLS ClientHello, the parser copies a device-claimed session_id length and validates the ciphersuite-list length against the total record length instead of the remaining bytes. An unauthenticated peer drives an OOB source read of up to 255 bytes, and those bytes are echoed verbatim into the outgoing ServerHello, disclosing adjacent process memory over the network. The crash variant fires on the first packet. | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-125 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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