BentoPDF: SSRF via DNS Rebinding (TOCTOU) in Cloudflare CORS Proxy Worker
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| alam00000 | bentopdf | affected |
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No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alam00000 | Bentopdf |
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No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.200% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Alam00000
Alam00000 bentopdf |
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| Vendors & Products |
Alam00000
Alam00000 bentopdf |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
|
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | BentoPDF is a privacy-focused PDF toolkit that runs in the browser. In versions through 2.8.6, cloudflare/cors-proxy-worker.js performs a DNS-over-HTTPS safety check in hostnameResolvesToPrivate(), as used by isValidCertificateUrl() and isValidTsaUrl(), separately from the outbound fetch(targetUrl, ...). In deployments where PROXY_SECRET validation is not enabled, a direct client that controls authoritative DNS can forge the Origin header, supply a certificate, OCSP, CRL, or TSA URL that passes the proxy's accepted path checks, return a public address during validation, and return a private or link-local address during the later fetch. The endpoint can return allowed response bodies to the attacker, but exploitation requires precise timing, redirects and IP-literal obfuscation are blocked, and network reachability limits the target. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.8.7. | |
| Title | BentoPDF: SSRF via DNS Rebinding (TOCTOU) in Cloudflare CORS Proxy Worker | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-367 CWE-918 |
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| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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