Netty 4.2.0 through 4.2.17 HTTP/3 Request Routing Bypass
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
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| netty | netty | unaffected |
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No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Netty | Netty |
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No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.236% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| Metrics |
ssvc
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| Title | Netty 4.2.0 through 4.2.18 HTTP/3 Request Routing Bypass | Netty 4.2.0 through 4.2.17 HTTP/3 Request Routing Bypass |
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| References |
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| Metrics |
threat_severity
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threat_severity
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| Description | Netty's HTTP/3 codec (io.netty:netty-codec-http3) in versions 4.2.0.Final through 4.2.17.Final does not enforce the RFC 9114 requirement that the :authority pseudo-header field and a literal host header field, when both present, carry the same value. A remote unauthenticated peer can send a single HEADERS frame containing both fields with differing, attacker-controlled values; the request is accepted and delivered to the application with two conflicting authorities, allowing routing, virtual-host, and access-control decisions to be bypassed when different components in the request path consult different fields. This issue is fixed in 4.2.18.Final. | |
| Title | Netty 4.2.0 through 4.2.18 HTTP/3 Request Routing Bypass | |
| First Time appeared |
Netty
Netty netty |
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| Weaknesses | CWE-444 | |
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:netty:netty:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Netty
Netty netty |
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| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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