Capgo OTA Manifest Poisoning via app_versions.manifest Bypass
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cap-go | capgo.app | unaffected |
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No data.
No data.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cap-go | Cap-go |
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No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is not in the KEV list.
Exploit prediction score: < 1% (0.407% probability within 30 days)
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
ssvc
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| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Cap-go
Cap-go cap-go |
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| Vendors & Products |
Cap-go
Cap-go cap-go |
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Capgo (capgo.app) blocks direct user inserts into the public.manifest table with a RESTRICTIVE row-level security policy, but that restriction can be bypassed indirectly. A principal holding an app-scoped upload/write/all API key (upload+ rights) or an authenticated user with write+ rights on an app can update public.app_versions.manifest on a version whose storage_provider is 'r2-direct', which is not covered by the bundle content-lock check. The on_version_update async worker trusts record.manifest and, using the service-role Supabase client, inserts the attacker-controlled file_name, file_hash, and s3_path into public.manifest before clearing app_versions.manifest. When a channel points to the crafted version, the /updates endpoint returns the service-role-created manifest entry as a client-facing download_url, enabling OTA manifest poisoning through a trusted async worker path. All versions are affected; no patch was available at the time of publication. | |
| Title | Capgo OTA Manifest Poisoning via app_versions.manifest Bypass | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-266 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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