CVE-2025-9824

User Enumeration via Response Timing

Published Sep 3, 2025 CVSS 3.1 · 5.9 Medium EPSS < 1% KEV · Not listed
Description
ImpactThe attacker can validate if a user exists by checking the time login returns. This timing difference can be used to enumerate valid usernames, after which an attacker could attempt brute force attacks.

PatchesThis vulnerability has been patched, implementing a timing-safe form login authenticator that ensures consistent response times regardless of whether a user exists or not.

Technical DetailsThe vulnerability was caused by different response times when:

* A valid username was provided (password hashing occurred)
* An invalid username was provided (no password hashing occurred)


The fix introduces a TimingSafeFormLoginAuthenticator that performs a dummy password hash verification even for non-existent users, ensuring consistent timing.

WorkaroundsNo workarounds are available. Users should upgrade to the patched version.

References * https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/03-Identity_Management_Testing/04-Testing_for_Account_Enumeration_and_Guessable_User_Account

Remediation

No solution or workaround provided in the CVE record

Tracking

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Advisories

Source ID Title
EUVD EUVD EUVD-2025-26524 ImpactThe attacker can validate if a user exists by checking the time login returns. This timing difference can be used to enumerate valid usernames, after which an attacker could attempt brute force attacks. PatchesThis vulnerability has been patched, implementing a timing-safe form login authenticator that ensures consistent response times regardless of whether a user exists or not. Technical DetailsThe vulnerability was caused by different response times when: * A valid username was provided (password hashing occurred) * An invalid username was provided (no password hashing occurred) The fix introduces a TimingSafeFormLoginAuthenticator that performs a dummy password hash verification even for non-existent users, ensuring consistent timing. WorkaroundsNo workarounds are available. Users should upgrade to the patched version. References * https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/03-Identity_Management_Testing/04-Testing_for_Account_Enumeration_and_Guessable_User_Account
Github GHSA Github GHSA GHSA-3ggv-qwcp-j6xg Mautic Vulnerable to User Enumeration via Response Timing
History
Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Mautic
Mautic mautic
Vendors & Products Mautic
Mautic mautic
Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description ImpactThe attacker can validate if a user exists by checking the time login returns. This timing difference can be used to enumerate valid usernames, after which an attacker could attempt brute force attacks. PatchesThis vulnerability has been patched, implementing a timing-safe form login authenticator that ensures consistent response times regardless of whether a user exists or not. Technical DetailsThe vulnerability was caused by different response times when: * A valid username was provided (password hashing occurred) * An invalid username was provided (no password hashing occurred) The fix introduces a TimingSafeFormLoginAuthenticator that performs a dummy password hash verification even for non-existent users, ensuring consistent timing. WorkaroundsNo workarounds are available. Users should upgrade to the patched version. References * https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/03-Identity_Management_Testing/04-Testing_for_Account_Enumeration_and_Guessable_User_Account
Title User Enumeration via Response Timing
Weaknesses CWE-204
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 5.9, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H'}

Weaknesses

Sources

Status
PUBLISHED
Assigner
Mautic
Published
Updated
Sep 3, 2025, 2:46 PM
Reserved
Sep 2, 2025, 8:28 AM
Status
Deferred
Published
Sep 3, 2025, 3:15 PM
Modified
Oct 19, 2026, 5:10 PM