CVE-2025-7054

{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.1", "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2025-7054", "assignerOrgId": "a22f1246-ba21-4bb4-a601-ad51614c1513", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "cloudflare", "dateReserved": "2025-07-03T21:30:56.005Z", "datePublished": "2025-08-07T15:19:29.542Z", "dateUpdated": "2025-08-07T15:52:20.008Z"}, "containers": {"cna": {"affected": [{"defaultStatus": "unaffected", "product": "quiche", "repo": "https://github.com/cloudflare/quiche", "vendor": "Cloudflare", "versions": [{"lessThan": "0.24.5", "status": "affected", "version": "0.15.0", "versionType": "semver"}]}], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "supportingMedia": [{"base64": false, "type": "text/html", "value": "<p><span style=\"background-color: transparent;\">Cloudflare quiche was discovered to be vulnerable to an infinite loop when sending packets containing RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames.</span></p><p><span style=\"background-color: transparent;\">QUIC connections possess a set of connection identifiers (IDs); see</span> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-5.1\"><span style=\"background-color: rgb(244, 249, 250);\">Section 5.1 of RFC 9000</span></a><span style=\"background-color: rgb(244, 249, 250);\">. </span><span style=\"background-color: transparent;\">Once the QUIC handshake completes, a local endpoint is responsible for issuing and retiring Connection IDs that are used by the remote peer to populate the Destination Connection ID field in packets sent from remote to local. Each Connection ID has a sequence number to ensure synchronization between peers.</span></p><span style=\"background-color: transparent;\">An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability by first completing a handshake and then sending a specially-crafted set of frames that trigger a connection ID retirement in the victim. When the victim attempts to send a packet containing RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames, </span><a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-19.6\"><span style=\"background-color: rgb(244, 249, 250);\">Section 19.16 of RFC 9000</span></a><span style=\"background-color: transparent;\"> requires that the sequence number of the retired connection ID must not be the same as the sequence number of the connection ID used by the packet. In other words, a packet cannot contain a frame that retires itself. In scenarios such as path migration, it is possible for there to be multiple active paths with different active connection IDs that could be used to retire each other. The exploit triggered an unintentional behaviour of a quiche design feature that supports retirement across paths while maintaining full connection ID synchronization, leading to an infinite loop.</span><p>This issue affects quiche: from 0.15.0 before 0.24.5.</p>"}], "value": "Cloudflare quiche was discovered to be vulnerable to an infinite loop when sending packets containing RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames.\n\nQUIC connections possess a set of connection identifiers (IDs); see Section 5.1 of RFC 9000 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-5.1 . Once the QUIC handshake completes, a local endpoint is responsible for issuing and retiring Connection IDs that are used by the remote peer to populate the Destination Connection ID field in packets sent from remote to local. Each Connection ID has a sequence number to ensure synchronization between peers.\n\nAn unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability by first completing a handshake and then sending a specially-crafted set of frames that trigger a connection ID retirement in the victim. When the victim attempts to send a packet containing RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames, Section 19.16 of RFC 9000 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-19.6 requires that the sequence number of the retired connection ID must not be the same as the sequence number of the connection ID used by the packet. In other words, a packet cannot contain a frame that retires itself. In scenarios such as path migration, it is possible for there to be multiple active paths with different active connection IDs that could be used to retire each other. The exploit triggered an unintentional behaviour of a quiche design feature that supports retirement across paths while maintaining full connection ID synchronization, leading to an infinite loop.This issue affects quiche: from 0.15.0 before 0.24.5."}], "metrics": [{"cvssV4_0": {"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED", "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED", "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackRequirements": "NONE", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "baseScore": 8.7, "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED", "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE", "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "userInteraction": "NONE", "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED", "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N", "version": "4.0", "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH", "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE", "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"}, "format": "CVSS", "scenarios": [{"lang": "en", "value": "GENERAL"}]}], "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"cweId": "CWE-835", "description": "CWE-835 Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop')", "lang": "en", "type": "CWE"}]}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "a22f1246-ba21-4bb4-a601-ad51614c1513", "shortName": "cloudflare", "dateUpdated": "2025-08-07T15:19:29.542Z"}, "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/cloudflare/quiche/security/advisories/GHSA-m3hh-f9gh-74c2"}], "source": {"discovery": "UNKNOWN"}, "title": "Infinite loop triggered by connection ID retirement", "x_generator": {"engine": "Vulnogram 0.2.0"}}, "adp": [{"metrics": [{"other": {"type": "ssvc", "content": {"timestamp": "2025-08-07T15:52:05.471684Z", "id": "CVE-2025-7054", "options": [{"Exploitation": "none"}, {"Automatable": "yes"}, {"Technical Impact": "partial"}], "role": "CISA Coordinator", "version": "2.0.3"}}}], "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment", "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "shortName": "CISA-ADP", "dateUpdated": "2025-08-07T15:52:20.008Z"}}]}}

{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "containers": {"adp": [{"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment", "metrics": [{"other": {"type": "ssvc", "content": {"id": "CVE-2025-7054", "role": "CISA Coordinator", "options": [{"Exploitation": "none"}, {"Automatable": "yes"}, {"Technical Impact": "partial"}], "version": "2.0.3", "timestamp": "2025-08-07T15:52:05.471684Z"}}}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "shortName": "CISA-ADP", "dateUpdated": "2025-08-07T15:52:12.201Z"}}], "cna": {"title": "Infinite loop triggered by connection ID retirement", "source": {"discovery": "UNKNOWN"}, "metrics": [{"format": "CVSS", "cvssV4_0": {"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED", "version": "4.0", "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED", "baseScore": 8.7, "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED", "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N", "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackRequirements": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH", "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE", "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE", "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"}, "scenarios": [{"lang": "en", "value": "GENERAL"}]}], "affected": [{"repo": "https://github.com/cloudflare/quiche", "vendor": "Cloudflare", "product": "quiche", "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "0.15.0", "lessThan": "0.24.5", "versionType": "semver"}], "defaultStatus": "unaffected"}], "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/cloudflare/quiche/security/advisories/GHSA-m3hh-f9gh-74c2"}], "x_generator": {"engine": "Vulnogram 0.2.0"}, "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Cloudflare quiche was discovered to be vulnerable to an infinite loop when sending packets containing RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames.\n\nQUIC connections possess a set of connection identifiers (IDs); see Section 5.1 of RFC 9000 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-5.1 . Once the QUIC handshake completes, a local endpoint is responsible for issuing and retiring Connection IDs that are used by the remote peer to populate the Destination Connection ID field in packets sent from remote to local. Each Connection ID has a sequence number to ensure synchronization between peers.\n\nAn unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability by first completing a handshake and then sending a specially-crafted set of frames that trigger a connection ID retirement in the victim. When the victim attempts to send a packet containing RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames, Section 19.16 of RFC 9000 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-19.6 requires that the sequence number of the retired connection ID must not be the same as the sequence number of the connection ID used by the packet. In other words, a packet cannot contain a frame that retires itself. In scenarios such as path migration, it is possible for there to be multiple active paths with different active connection IDs that could be used to retire each other. The exploit triggered an unintentional behaviour of a quiche design feature that supports retirement across paths while maintaining full connection ID synchronization, leading to an infinite loop.This issue affects quiche: from 0.15.0 before 0.24.5.", "supportingMedia": [{"type": "text/html", "value": "<p><span style=\"background-color: transparent;\">Cloudflare quiche was discovered to be vulnerable to an infinite loop when sending packets containing RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames.</span></p><p><span style=\"background-color: transparent;\">QUIC connections possess a set of connection identifiers (IDs); see</span> <a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-5.1\"><span style=\"background-color: rgb(244, 249, 250);\">Section 5.1 of RFC 9000</span></a><span style=\"background-color: rgb(244, 249, 250);\">. </span><span style=\"background-color: transparent;\">Once the QUIC handshake completes, a local endpoint is responsible for issuing and retiring Connection IDs that are used by the remote peer to populate the Destination Connection ID field in packets sent from remote to local. Each Connection ID has a sequence number to ensure synchronization between peers.</span></p><span style=\"background-color: transparent;\">An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability by first completing a handshake and then sending a specially-crafted set of frames that trigger a connection ID retirement in the victim. When the victim attempts to send a packet containing RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames, </span><a target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-19.6\"><span style=\"background-color: rgb(244, 249, 250);\">Section 19.16 of RFC 9000</span></a><span style=\"background-color: transparent;\"> requires that the sequence number of the retired connection ID must not be the same as the sequence number of the connection ID used by the packet. In other words, a packet cannot contain a frame that retires itself. In scenarios such as path migration, it is possible for there to be multiple active paths with different active connection IDs that could be used to retire each other. The exploit triggered an unintentional behaviour of a quiche design feature that supports retirement across paths while maintaining full connection ID synchronization, leading to an infinite loop.</span><p>This issue affects quiche: from 0.15.0 before 0.24.5.</p>", "base64": false}]}], "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "type": "CWE", "cweId": "CWE-835", "description": "CWE-835 Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop')"}]}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "a22f1246-ba21-4bb4-a601-ad51614c1513", "shortName": "cloudflare", "dateUpdated": "2025-08-07T15:19:29.542Z"}}}, "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2025-7054", "state": "PUBLISHED", "dateUpdated": "2025-08-07T15:52:20.008Z", "dateReserved": "2025-07-03T21:30:56.005Z", "assignerOrgId": "a22f1246-ba21-4bb4-a601-ad51614c1513", "datePublished": "2025-08-07T15:19:29.542Z", "assignerShortName": "cloudflare"}, "dataVersion": "5.1"}

{"affected": [{"affectedData": [{"defaultStatus": "unaffected", "product": "quiche", "repo": "https://github.com/cloudflare/quiche", "vendor": "Cloudflare", "versions": [{"lessThan": "0.24.5", "status": "affected", "version": "0.15.0", "versionType": "semver"}]}], "source": "cna@cloudflare.com"}], "configurations": [{"nodes": [{"cpeMatch": [{"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:cloudflare:quiche:*:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*", "matchCriteriaId": "A953884D-FE8D-4510-BCC3-5B30E3D66F34", "versionEndExcluding": "0.24.5", "versionStartIncluding": "0.15.0", "vulnerable": true}], "negate": false, "operator": "OR"}]}], "cveTags": [], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Cloudflare quiche was discovered to be vulnerable to an infinite loop when sending packets containing RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames.\n\nQUIC connections possess a set of connection identifiers (IDs); see Section 5.1 of RFC 9000 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-5.1 . Once the QUIC handshake completes, a local endpoint is responsible for issuing and retiring Connection IDs that are used by the remote peer to populate the Destination Connection ID field in packets sent from remote to local. Each Connection ID has a sequence number to ensure synchronization between peers.\n\nAn unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability by first completing a handshake and then sending a specially-crafted set of frames that trigger a connection ID retirement in the victim. When the victim attempts to send a packet containing RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames, Section 19.16 of RFC 9000 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-19.6 requires that the sequence number of the retired connection ID must not be the same as the sequence number of the connection ID used by the packet. In other words, a packet cannot contain a frame that retires itself. In scenarios such as path migration, it is possible for there to be multiple active paths with different active connection IDs that could be used to retire each other. The exploit triggered an unintentional behaviour of a quiche design feature that supports retirement across paths while maintaining full connection ID synchronization, leading to an infinite loop.This issue affects quiche: from 0.15.0 before 0.24.5."}, {"lang": "es", "value": "Se descubri\u00f3 que Cloudflare Quiche era vulnerable a un bucle infinito al enviar paquetes que conten\u00edan tramas RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID. Las conexiones QUIC poseen un conjunto de identificadores de conexi\u00f3n (ID); consulte la Secci\u00f3n 5.1 de RFC 9000 (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-5.1). Una vez completado el protocolo de enlace QUIC, un endpoint local se encarga de emitir y retirar los ID de conexi\u00f3n que utiliza el punto remoto para rellenar el campo ID de conexi\u00f3n de destino en los paquetes enviados desde el punto remoto al local. Cada ID de conexi\u00f3n tiene un n\u00famero de secuencia para garantizar la sincronizaci\u00f3n entre los puntos. Un atacante remoto no autenticado puede explotar esta vulnerabilidad completando primero un protocolo de enlace y luego enviando un conjunto de tramas especialmente manipuladas que desencadenan el retiro del ID de conexi\u00f3n en la v\u00edctima. Cuando la v\u00edctima intenta enviar un paquete que contiene tramas RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID, la Secci\u00f3n 19.16 de RFC 9000 (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-19.6) exige que el n\u00famero de secuencia del ID de conexi\u00f3n retirado no coincida con el del ID de conexi\u00f3n utilizado por el paquete. En otras palabras, un paquete no puede contener una trama que se retire a s\u00ed misma. En escenarios como la migraci\u00f3n de rutas, es posible que existan m\u00faltiples rutas activas con diferentes ID de conexi\u00f3n activos que podr\u00edan utilizarse para retirarse mutuamente. El exploit desencaden\u00f3 un comportamiento involuntario de una caracter\u00edstica de dise\u00f1o de quiche que permite el retiro entre rutas manteniendo la sincronizaci\u00f3n completa del ID de conexi\u00f3n, lo que provoc\u00f3 un bucle infinito. Este problema afecta a quiche desde la versi\u00f3n 0.15.0 hasta la 0.24.5."}], "id": "CVE-2025-7054", "lastModified": "2026-06-17T10:04:10.283", "metrics": {"cvssMetricV31": [{"cvssData": {"attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 6.5, "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityImpact": "NONE", "integrityImpact": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H", "version": "3.1"}, "exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "impactScore": 3.6, "source": "nvd@nist.gov", "type": "Primary"}], "cvssMetricV40": [{"cvssData": {"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED", "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED", "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackRequirements": "NONE", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "baseScore": 8.7, "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED", "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED", "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE", "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "userInteraction": "NONE", "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED", "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X", "version": "4.0", "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH", "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE", "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"}, "source": "cna@cloudflare.com", "type": "Secondary"}], "ssvcV203": [{"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "ssvcData": {"id": "CVE-2025-7054", "options": [{"exploitation": "none"}, {"automatable": "yes"}, {"technicalImpact": "partial"}], "role": "CISA Coordinator", "timestamp": "2025-08-07T15:52:05.471684Z", "version": "2.0.3"}}]}, "published": "2025-08-07T16:15:31.460", "references": [{"source": "cna@cloudflare.com", "tags": ["Third Party Advisory"], "url": "https://github.com/cloudflare/quiche/security/advisories/GHSA-m3hh-f9gh-74c2"}], "sourceIdentifier": "cna@cloudflare.com", "vulnStatus": "Analyzed", "weaknesses": [{"description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-835"}], "source": "cna@cloudflare.com", "type": "Secondary"}]}

{}

{"created": "2025-08-07T21:50:49.372260+00:00", "updated": "2025-08-07T21:50:49.372320+00:00", "vendors": ["cloudflare", "cloudflare$PRODUCT$quiche"]}