tls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
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| Linux | Linux | unaffected |
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| Linux | Linux | affected |
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| Vendor | Product | Versions |
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| Linux | Linux Kernel | — |
| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
Debian DLA |
DLA-4328-1 | linux-6.1 security update |
Debian DSA |
DSA-6008-1 | linux security update |
Debian DSA |
DSA-6009-1 | linux security update |
EUVD |
EUVD-2025-31542 | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list Each recvmsg() call must process either - only contiguous DATA records (any number of them) - one non-DATA record If the next record has different type than what has already been processed we break out of the main processing loop. If the record has already been decrypted (which may be the case for TLS 1.3 where we don't know type until decryption) we queue the pending record to the rx_list. Next recvmsg() will pick it up from there. Queuing the skb to rx_list after zero-copy decrypt is not possible, since in that case we decrypted directly to the user space buffer, and we don't have an skb to queue (darg.skb points to the ciphertext skb for access to metadata like length). Only data records are allowed zero-copy, and we break the processing loop after each non-data record. So we should never zero-copy and then find out that the record type has changed. The corner case we missed is when the initial record comes from rx_list, and it's zero length. |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7833-1 | Linux kernel vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7834-1 | Linux kernel (Azure) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7833-2 | Linux kernel (Real-time) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7835-1 | Linux kernel vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7835-2 | Linux kernel (Real-time) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7835-3 | Linux kernel vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7833-3 | Linux kernel (AWS) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7833-4 | Linux kernel (GCP) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7835-4 | Linux kernel (HWE) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7856-1 | Linux kernel (HWE) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7835-5 | Linux kernel (Oracle) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7835-6 | Linux kernel (AWS) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7887-1 | Linux kernel (Raspberry Pi Real-time) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7887-2 | Linux kernel (Raspberry Pi) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7940-1 | Linux kernel (Azure FIPS) vulnerabilities |
Ubuntu USN |
USN-7940-2 | Linux kernel (Azure, N-Series) vulnerabilities |
No CVSS v4.0
No CVSS v3.0
No CVSS v2
This CVE is in the KEV database since Sept. 18, 2026.
Exploit prediction score: 3.3% (3.312% probability within 30 days)
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Siemens
Siemens simatic Cn 4100 Siemens simatic Cn 4100 Firmware |
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| CPEs | cpe:2.3:h:siemens:simatic_cn_4100:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:siemens:simatic_cn_4100_firmware:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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Siemens
Siemens simatic Cn 4100 Siemens simatic Cn 4100 Firmware |
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| Weaknesses | CWE-754 | |
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cvssV3_1
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Debian
Debian debian Linux |
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| Weaknesses | NVD-CWE-Other | |
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:11.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.17:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:* cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.17:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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Debian
Debian debian Linux |
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cvssV3_1
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cvssV3_1
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Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
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| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
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threat_severity
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cvssV3_1
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| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list Each recvmsg() call must process either - only contiguous DATA records (any number of them) - one non-DATA record If the next record has different type than what has already been processed we break out of the main processing loop. If the record has already been decrypted (which may be the case for TLS 1.3 where we don't know type until decryption) we queue the pending record to the rx_list. Next recvmsg() will pick it up from there. Queuing the skb to rx_list after zero-copy decrypt is not possible, since in that case we decrypted directly to the user space buffer, and we don't have an skb to queue (darg.skb points to the ciphertext skb for access to metadata like length). Only data records are allowed zero-copy, and we break the processing loop after each non-data record. So we should never zero-copy and then find out that the record type has changed. The corner case we missed is when the initial record comes from rx_list, and it's zero length. | |
| Title | tls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list | |
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